Arctic
Cyber Security Deployment Guideline
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Section 1 Introduction

1.1 This manual

The cyber security deployment guideline describes the process for handling cyber security when communicating with the device. The cyber security deployment guideline provides information on how to secure the system on which the device is installed. The guideline can be used as a technical reference during the engineering phase, installation and commissioning phase, and during normal service.

1.2 Intended audience

This guideline is intended for the system engineering, commissioning, operation and maintenance personnel handling cybersecurity during the engineering, installation and commissioning phases, and during normal service.

The personnel is expected to have general knowledge about topics related to cybersecurity.

• Protection and control devices, gateways and Windows workstations
• Networking, including Ethernet and TCP/IP with its concept of ports and services
• Security policies
• Firewalls
• Antivirus protection
• Application whitelisting
• Secure remote communication

1.3 Product documentation

1.3.1 Product documentation set

1.3.2 Document revision history

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Document revision/date</th>
<th>Product versions</th>
<th>History</th>
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<tr>
<td>A/2017-09-28</td>
<td>Arctic 600 devices Ver.3.4&lt;br&gt;ARM600 Ver.4.3</td>
<td>First release</td>
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<tr>
<td>B/2018-06-29</td>
<td>Arctic 600 devices Ver.3.4.5&lt;br&gt;ARM600 Ver.4.4.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>C/2019-04-24</td>
<td>Arctic 600 devices Ver.3.4.7&lt;br&gt;ARM600 Ver.4.5.1</td>
<td>Content updated to correspond to the product versions</td>
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1.3.3 Related documentation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of the document</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Document ID</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wireless Controller M2M solution security guide</td>
<td></td>
<td>1MRS758448</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Configuring Arctic Wireless Gateways/Controllers and ARM600</td>
<td></td>
<td>1MRS758449</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3G/LTE configuration guide Technical Note</td>
<td>Configuring Wireless Gateways, Controllers and M2M Gateway</td>
<td>1MRS758449</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


1.4 Symbols and conventions

1.4.1 Symbols

The caution icon indicates important information or warning related to the concept discussed in the text. It might indicate the presence of a hazard which could result in corruption of software or damage to equipment or property.

The information icon alerts the reader of important facts and conditions.

The tip icon indicates advice on, for example, how to design your project or how to use a certain function.
Although warning hazards are related to personal injury, it is necessary to understand that under certain operational conditions, operation of damaged equipment may result in degraded process performance leading to personal injury or death. Therefore, comply fully with all warning and caution notices.

1.4.2 Document conventions

A particular convention may not be used in this manual.

- Abbreviations and acronyms are spelled out in the glossary. The glossary also contains definitions of important terms.
- Menu paths are presented in bold. Select **Main menu/Settings**.
- Parameter names are shown in italics.
  The function can be enabled and disabled with the *Operation* setting.
- Parameter values are indicated with quotation marks.
  The corresponding parameter values are "On" and "Off".

Section 2 Security in distribution automation

2.1 General security in distribution automation

Technological advancements and breakthroughs have caused a significant evolution in the electric power grid. As a result, the emerging “smart grid” and “Internet of Things” are quickly becoming a reality. At the heart of these intelligent advancements are specialized IT systems – various control and automation solutions such as distribution automation systems. To provide end users with comprehensive real-time information, enabling higher reliability and greater control, automation systems have become ever more interconnected. To combat the increased risks associated with these interconnections, ABB offers a wide range of cyber security products and solutions for automation systems and critical infrastructure.

The new generation of automation systems uses open standards such as IEC 60870-5-104, DNP3 and IEC 61850 and commercial technologies, in particular Ethernet and TCP/IP based communication protocols. They also enable connectivity to external networks, such as office intranet systems and the Internet. These changes in technology, including the adoption of open IT standards, have brought huge benefits from an operational perspective, but they have also introduced cyber security concerns previously known only to office or enterprise IT systems.

To counter cyber security risks, open IT standards are equipped with cyber security mechanisms. These mechanisms, developed in a large number of enterprise environments, are proven technologies. They enable the design, development and continual improvement of cyber security solutions also for control systems, including distribution automation applications.

ABB understands the importance of cyber security and its role in advancing the security of distribution networks. A customer investing in new ABB technologies can rely on system solutions where reliability and security have the highest priority.

Reporting of vulnerability or cyber security issues related to any ABB product can be done via cybersecurity@ch.abb.com.

2.2 Reference documents

Information security in critical infrastructure like electrical distribution and transmission networks has been in high focus for both vendors and utilities. This together with developing technology, for example, appliance of Ethernet and IP based communication networks in substations, power plants and network control centers creates a need of specifying systems with cyber security.
ABB is involved in the standardization and definition of several cyber standards, the most applicable and referred ones are ISO 2700x, IEC 62443, IEEE P1686 and IEC 62351. Besides standardization efforts there are also several governments initiated requirements and practices like NERC CIP and BDEW. ABB fully understands the importance of cyber security for substation automation systems and is committed to support users in efforts to achieve or maintain compliance to these.
Section 3 Secure system setup

3.1 Basic system hardening rules

Today's distribution automation systems are basically specialized IT systems. Therefore, several rules of hardening an automation system apply to these systems, too. Protection and control relays are from the automation system perspective on the lowest level and closest to the actual primary process. It is important to apply defense-in-depth information assurance concept where each layer in the system is capable of protecting the automation system and therefore protection and control relays are also part of this concept. The following should be taken into consideration when planning the system protection.

- Recognizing and familiarizing all parts of the system and the system's communication links
- Removing all unnecessary communication links in the system
- Rating the security level of remaining connections and improving with applicable methods
- Hardening the system by removing or deactivating all unused processes, communication ports and services
- Checking that the whole system has backups available from all applicable parts
- Collecting and storing backups of the system components and keeping those up-to-date
- Removing all unnecessary user accounts
- Changing default passwords and using strong enough passwords
- Checking that the link from substation to upper level system uses strong enough encryption and authentication
- Separating public network from automation network
- Segmenting traffic and networks
- Using firewalls and demilitarized zones
- Assessing the system periodically
- Using antivirus software in workstations and keeping those up-to-date

It is important to utilize the defence-in-depth concept when designing automation system security. It is not recommended to connect a device directly to the Internet without adequate additional security components. The different layers and interfaces in the system should use security controls. Robust security means, besides product features, enabling and using the available features and also enforcing their use by company policies. Adequate training is also needed for the personnel accessing and using the system.
3.2 System overview

M2M Gateway ARM600 is a member of ABB’s Arctic product family. ARM600 is a communication server, a VPN concentrator and firewall, and is typically placed within the same location as the central control and monitoring system, such as SCADA. ARM600 manages all Arctic 600 series wireless gateway connections and is the main interface between the field devices and the central control and monitoring system. Connection between Arctic and ARM600 is typically established via cellular network and VPN.

Arctic 600 series provides wireless connection of field devices via cellular network from a central site or control center. The devices offer industrial quality connectivity for TCP/IP based protocols. Wireless Gateway ARG600 exhibits integrated communication capability and seamless integration to SCADA systems using ARM600 VPN and management services.
Figure 2: Communication solution in distribution automation
Section 4  Arctic 600 series

4.1  Communication interfaces

Arctic devices have three communication ports that can be disabled from configuration.

- LAN (Ethernet) port
- Cellular
- Serial ports

The dual SIM models have two additional ports.

- Console port
- WAN port

4.2  TCP/IP based protocols and used IP ports

IP port security depends on specific installation, requirements and existing infrastructure. The required external equipment can be separate devices or devices that combine firewall, router and secure VPN functionality. When the network is divided into security zones, it is done using either substation devices with firewall functionality or dedicated firewall products. Security zone boundaries are inside the substation or between the substation and the outside world.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Port number</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Default state</th>
<th>IPv4</th>
<th>IPv6</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>TCP</td>
<td>Open</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>SSH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>443</td>
<td>TCP</td>
<td>Open</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Web HTTPS (WHMI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>TCP/UDP</td>
<td>Open</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>DNS Proxy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2404</td>
<td>TCP</td>
<td>Open</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>IEC-104 (model dependant)</td>
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<tr>
<td>7001</td>
<td>TCP</td>
<td>Open</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Serial GW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7003</td>
<td>TCP</td>
<td>Open</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Serial GW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5355</td>
<td>UDP</td>
<td>Open</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>LLMNR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5353, 32768...61000</td>
<td>UDP</td>
<td>Open</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>mDNS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.3 Secure communication

Arctic devices support encrypted communication to user configuration via HTTPS (WHMI) and SSH protocols. All other communications into the device are recommended to be used via a VPN tunnel.

4.3.1 Certificate handling

For encryption and secure identification of WHMI (HTTPS protocol) the device uses public key certificates that bind together a public key with an identity, that is, information such as the name of an organization, their address and so on. The server certificate used by the device is generated by the device itself as a self-signed certificate and not issued by any certification authority (CA).

Certificates use encryption to provide secure communication over the network. A self-signed X.509 certificate is generated by the device.

The certificate is used to verify that a public key belongs to an identity. In case of HTTPS, the WHMI server in the device presents the certificate to the Web client giving the client the public key and the identity of the server. The public key is one part of an asymmetric key algorithm in which one key is used to encrypt a message and another key is used to decrypt it. The public private key pair (asymmetric key) is used to exchange the symmetric key, which is used to encrypt and decrypt the data that is exchanged between server and client.

For WHMI use, the certificate signed by the device must be accepted in the Web browser when opening the connection to WHMI. The Web browser displays a warning because the WHMI uses self-signed certificates.

4.3.2 Virtual private networks

The virtual private networks are used, for example, in extending or routing the company’s local area network to the remote site using publicly available media such as the Internet. The Arctic system VPN tunnel implementations are SSH-VPN, L2TP-VPN and OpenVPN. The first two are proprietary implementations providing a link between the M2M gateway and the cellular gateways, while the third can be used for connecting also third-party devices, such as computers, to the M2M gateway for administration or control purposes.

The implementation of the VPN defines certain security characteristics. Thus, they can be listed in order from strongest to weakest security in M2M solution:

- OpenVPN
- SSH-VPN
- L2TP-VPN
L2TP-VPN does not offer encryption of traffic. When connected to public networks, it is recommended to use OpenVPN.

OpenVPN is the only recommended option.

4.4 Web HMI

WHMI is one of the available user access services in the device. The service is enabled by default and the HTTPS TCP port is open for connections.

For the HTTPS access, the Web client must support HTTPS via TLS 1.1/1.2. The WHMI is verified with Internet Explorer 8.0, 9.0, 10.0 and 11.0. The recommend connection setting is TLS 1.2.

4.5 Security

Certain measures should be taken to enhance operator and subscription security.

• Network subscription and SIM card must be stored safely and configured to prevent misuse of services.
  • Unused services should be disabled from SIM cards.
    • Voice calls
    • SMS
    • Paid services
    • Roaming
  • Pin code should be used in SIM cards.
• A private APN service from the operator should be preferred.
• M2M subscription SIM cards from the operator should be preferred.
• Private IP addressing from the operator for cellular network based communications should be used.
• If connected to a public IP network, plain text protocols such as http, SNMP and telnet should not be used. Instead, VPN should always be used to connect to the device.

4.6 Firewall

The Arctic wireless devices have internal firewalls. By default the Arctic firewall is enabled and the default rules for standard traffic are applicable. For optimal security, the recommended approach is to limit the allowed packets, if possible. The firewall
should be set to drop all packets via the WHMI path **Firewall/Generic/Default Actions** and then to allow the needed packets, the most frequent packets appearing first in the list. User-defined filtering tables are available for the Filter Incoming, Filter Forwarded and Filter Outgoing packets under **Network/Firewall**. Generic rules are applied before the user-defined filtering tables.

The current firewall status can be monitored via **System/Status/Firewall**. More detailed information on the firewall rules can be obtained from **Tools/Support log**.

All the firewall rules under **Firewall/General** are applied before the user-defined rules in Filter Incoming, Filter Forwarded and Filter Outgoing. If the generic rules are used to allow traffic, the user-applied rules cannot block the same traffic allowed by the generic rules.

### 4.7 User management

Arctic devices have three user accounts. The credentials for arctic-adm user and the password for root user can be changed via **WHMI Tool/User Config**. The restricted shell credentials can be changed via **WHMI Tool/Restricted Shell**.

**Table 2:** Arctic user accounts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Username</th>
<th>Password</th>
<th>Interface</th>
<th>Enabled by default</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>root</td>
<td>arct1cemt0em</td>
<td>Console, su</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>arctic-adm</td>
<td>arcticm2m</td>
<td>Console, WHMI, SSH</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>arctic-user</td>
<td>arcticm2m</td>
<td>SSH (restricted shell)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 4.8 Backup files

Backup of the current Arctic device configuration can be downloaded via **Tools/Configuration Profiles/Export** by selecting the active profile.

If Arctic Patrol is used and the **Backup active configuration to server** parameter, found via menu path **Services/Patrol**, is enabled, the device automatically transfers the configuration to the patrol server located in ARM600.

### 4.9 Restoring administrator password

If authentication is enabled in the device and the administrator password is lost, it is no longer possible to change passwords or operate the device with full access rights.
- Contact ABB technical customer support to retrieve back the administrator level access to the device.
Section 5  ARM600

5.1 Communication interfaces

ARM600 has two or four Ethernet communication ports that can be disabled from configuration via WHMI path Network / Network Configuration.

- LAN (Ethernet) ports Gb1 and Gb2 in the standard edition
- LAN (Ethernet) ports Ethernet 1, Ethernet 2, Ethernet 3 and Ethernet 4 in the enterprise edition

ARM600 can be accessed also locally via the VGA display and USB keyboard.

5.2 TCP/IP based protocols and used IP ports

IP port security depends on specific installation, requirements and existing infrastructure. The required external equipment can be separate devices or devices that combine firewall, router and secure VPN functionality. When the network is divided into security zones, it is done using either substation devices with firewall functionality or dedicated firewall products. Security zone boundaries are inside the substation or between the substation and the outside world.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Port number</th>
<th>Type</th>
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<th>IPv4</th>
<th>IPv6</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>TCP</td>
<td>Open</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>SSH-VPN, Patrol Server</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10022</td>
<td>TCP</td>
<td>Open</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>SSH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10000</td>
<td>TCP</td>
<td>Open</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Web HTTPS (WHMI), Patrol Server</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>443</td>
<td>TCP</td>
<td>Open</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Web Server HTTPS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1701</td>
<td>UDP</td>
<td>Closed</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>L2TP-VPN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1194...1200</td>
<td>UDP/TCP</td>
<td>Closed</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>OpenVPN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.3 Secure communication

Arctic devices support encrypted communication to user configuration via HTTPS (WHMI) and SSH protocols. All other communications into the device are recommended to be used via a VPN tunnel.

5.3.1 Certificate handling

For encryption and secure identification of WHMI (HTTPS protocol) the device uses public key certificates that bind together a public key with an identity, that is, information such as the name of an organization, their address and so on. The server certificate used by the device is generated by the device itself as a self-signed certificate and not issued by any certification authority (CA).

Certificates use encryption to provide secure communication over the network. A self-signed X.509 certificate generated by the device.

The certificate is used to verify that a public key belongs to an identity. In case of HTTPS, the WHMI server in the device presents the certificate to the Web client giving the client the public key and the identity of the server. The public key is one part of an asymmetric key algorithm in which one key is used to encrypt a message and another key is used to decrypt it. The public private key pair (asymmetric key) is used to exchange the symmetric key, which is used to encrypt and decrypt the data that is exchanged between server and client.

For WHMI use, the certificate signed by the device must be accepted in the Web browser when opening the connection to WHMI. The Web browser displays a warning because WHMI uses self-signed certificates.

5.3.2 Virtual private networks

The virtual private networks are used, for example, in extending or routing the company’s local area network to the remote site using publicly available media, such as the Internet. ARM600 offers VPN tunnel server implementations SSH-VPN, L2TP-VPN and OpenVPN. The first two are proprietary implementations providing a link between ARM600 and the Arctic cellular gateways, while the third can be used also for connecting third-party devices, such as computers, to the M2M gateway for administration or control purposes.

The implementation of the VPN defines certain security characteristics. Thus, they can be listed in order from strongest to weakest security in M2M solution:

- OpenVPN
- SSH-VPN
- L2TP-VPN
L2TP-VPN does not offer encryption of traffic. When connected to public networks, it is recommended to use OpenVPN.

OpenVPN is the only recommended option.

5.3.3 OpenVPN server

OpenVPN is the most recommended VPN type between the Arctic and ARM600 devices. ARM600 supports OpenVPN in two different modes.

- Normal (Layer 3, IP)
- Bridge (Layer 2)

Normal (Layer 3, IP) is the most common mode. In this mode the IP routing is used to communicate with OpenVPN clients that are typically Arctic devices. By default, the OpenVPN clients connected to the same server are allowed to communicate with each other. This can be limited by changing the OpenVPN server and firewall configurations.

In the default configuration, the ARM600 firewall cannot limit the IP connections between OpenVPN peers connected to the same OpenVPN server.

When a new ARM600 OpenVPN server is created, it uses self-signed certificates, with an expiry time of 10 years, for authentication. It is recommended to use certificates with RSA 2048-bit with SHA-2 digital signature algorithm for all the devices using OpenVPN server.

When the OpenVPN client or server certificates have expired, the remote Arctic devices cannot establish an OpenVPN connection. Check the certificate expiry dates and renew the certificates from VPN/OpenVPN. OpenVPN certificates can be renewed in ARM600 Ver.4.4.1 or later.

5.3.4 Time synchronization

By default ARM600 synchronizes the clock via NTP from centos.pool.ntp.org. It is recommended to set the NTP synchronization to local stratum 1 clock.
5.3.5 **Patrol server**

Patrol server is used remotely for the updating and managing of a large group of Arctic devices (batch updates). The Arctic Patrol Client connects to ARM600 either using the SSH protocol running in port 22 or the HTTPS protocol running in port 10000. It is recommended to limit access to these ports with a firewall, for example, by introducing allowed IP address ranges.

5.3.6 **SSH-VPN server**

By default the ARM600 SSH-VPN server is enabled in port 22. This port is shared with Arctic Patrol if SSH is used as a Patrol protocol. It is recommended to allow only SSH Protocol version 2 and to limit access to these ports with a firewall, for example, by introducing allowed IP address ranges.

In ARM600 Ver.4.4.1 or later support for SSHv1 has been disabled. The SSH legacy mode might be activated automatically on backup restore or when the update installer is used. A notification is shown at the top of the screen if legacy mode is activated.

The SSH legacy mode is enabled only if SSHv1 support was previously activated (SSH-VPN settings) and at least one active SSH-VPN client or Patrol connection uses SSHv1 keys.

5.3.7 **SSH server (admin)**

By default the ARM600 SSH for administration server is enabled in port 10022. It is recommended to limit access to port 10022 with a firewall, for example, by introducing allowed IP address ranges. The SSH service can be disabled by issuing command `systemctl disable sshd-admin`.

5.3.8 **IPv6**

ARM600 uses a link-local address (IPv6 unicast address) that is automatically configured using the link-local prefix FE80::/10. By default the IPv6 firewall blocks the incoming connections, except for ICMP. The IPv6 firewall rules can be issued with the `ip6tables-save` command.

The default rules for IPv6 firewall are:

```plaintext
*filter
:INPUT DROP [0:0]
:FORWARD DROP [0:0]
:OUTPUT ACCEPT [7:460]
-A INPUT -i lo -j ACCEPT
-A INPUT -p ipv6-icmp -j ACCEPT
-A INPUT -p tcp -m tcp ! --tcp-flags SYN,RST,ACK SYN -j ACCEPT
COMMIT
```

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5.4 Web HMI

WHMI is one of the available user access services in the device. The service is enabled by default and the HTTPS TCP port 10000 is open for connections.

For the HTTPS access, the Web client must support HTTPS via TLS 1.1/1.2. The WHMI is verified with Internet Explorer 8.0, 9.0, 10.0 and 11.0. The recommend connection setting is TLS 1.2.

5.5 Security

To ensure the highest security, ARM600 should be installed behind a firewall, for example, in company DMZ zone.

**ARM600 in the company’s DMZ**

The DMZ is a safe subnet, separated by firewalls from the company LAN and from the Internet. The servers requiring accessibility from the Internet are placed in the DMZ. The company’s border router/firewall forwards the VPN port from the public IP to ARM600, which has a private IP address and uses border router as a default gateway.

![Figure 3: DMZ installation](image)

ARM600 has an internal firewall (iptables) which should be enabled also when the external firewall is used. For the highest security, customized firewall (iptables) rules should be applied according to the network setup. The ARM600 custom firewall rules are available in the ARM600 WHMI via **Firewall/Custon rules**. All access to ports should be limited as much as possible by allowing access only from known remote network IP or interface and by allowing incoming connections only to the available ports.
5.6 User management

ARM600 has two user accounts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Username</th>
<th>Password</th>
<th>Interface</th>
<th>Enabled by default</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>root</td>
<td>arct1cemt0em</td>
<td>VGA console, su</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>arctic-adm</td>
<td>arcticm2m</td>
<td>VGA console, WHMI, SSH</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The credentials for arctic-adm user and the password for root user can be changed via WHMI path Tools/User Administration.

Non-interactive user accounts are available for Patrol and SSH-VPN access.

5.7 Backup

Backup of the current ARM600 configuration can be generated via Tools/Backup/Create Backup. This generates backup from OpenVPNs, SSH-VPNs, L2TP-VPNs, all Patrol configurations (excluding Arctic configuration backups), SSH keys and firewall configuration.

If needed, a full backup can be taken from ARM600 via Tools/Backup/Create full backup/. Full backup restoring is not supported.

5.8 Auto backup

Auto backup can be used for synchronizing the backups automatically to a secondary ARM600. The backup is transferred with admin SSH (default port 10022) by using the arctic-adm user with public key authentication.

5.9 Restoring administrator password

If authentication is enabled in the device and the administrator password is lost, it is no longer possible to change passwords or operate the device with full access rights.

- Contact ABB technical customer support to retrieve back the administrator level access to the device.
Section 6 Glossary

APN  Access Point Name
BDEW  Bundesverband der Energie- und Wasserwirtschaft
CA  Certification authority
DMZ  De-militarized zone
DNP3  A distributed network protocol originally developed by Westronic. The DNP3 Users Group has the ownership of the protocol and assumes responsibility for its evolution.
DNS  Domain Name System
Ethernet  A standard for connecting a family of frame-based computer networking technologies into a LAN
HTTPS  Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure
ICMP  Internet Control Message Protocol
IEC  International Electrotechnical Commission
IEC 60870-5-104  Network access for IEC 60870-5-101
IEC 61850  International standard for substation communication and modeling
IEEE  Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc.
IP  Internet protocol
IP address  A set of four numbers between 0 and 255, separated by periods. Each server connected to the Internet is assigned a unique IP address that specifies the location for the TCP/IP protocol.
IPv6  Internet protocol version 6
ISO  International Standard Organization
M2M  Machine to machine
NERC CIP  North American Electric Reliability Corporation - Critical Infrastructure Protection
NTP  Network time protocol
SCADA  Supervision, control and data acquisition
SIM  Subscriber identity module
SMS  1. Short Message Service  
  2. Station monitoring system
| **SNMP** | Simple Network Management Protocol |
| **SSH** | Secure shell |
| **TCP** | Transmission Control Protocol |
| **TCP/IP** | Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol |
| **Telnet** | An Internet protocol that allows logging on to a remote computer using a user name and password |
| **UDP** | User datagram protocol |
| **VPN** | Virtual Private Network |
| **WHMI** | Web human-machine interface |