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CYBERSECURITY ADVISORY

# **SECURITY System 800xA Information Manager - Remote Code Execution**

CVE ID: CVE-2020-8477

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## Affected products

System 800xA, Information Manager

Versions 5.1, 6.0 (6.0.0 to 6.0.3.2) and 6.1

## Vulnerability IDs, Product Issue Numbers

| CVE ID        | Product Issue Numbers |
|---------------|-----------------------|
| CVE-2020-8477 | 800xAINM-OL-5101-016  |

## Summary

ABB is aware that the Information Manager for System 800xA contains a Remote Code Execution vulnerability which require user attention. An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could insert and run arbitrary code on the Information Manager server.

## Vulnerability severity

The severity assessment has been performed by using the FIRST Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) v3. The CVSS Environmental Score, which can affect the vulnerability severity, is not provided in this advisory since it reflects the potential impact of a vulnerability within the end-user organizations' computing environment; end-user organizations are therefore recommended to analyze their situation and specify the Environmental Score.

CVSS v3 Base Score: 8.8 (High)

CVSS v3 Temporal Score: 8.1 (High)

CVSS v3 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:P/RL:W/RC:C

CVSS v3 Link: <https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.0#CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:P/RL:W/RC:C>

NVD Summary Link: <https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2020-8477>

## Recommended immediate actions

This problem will be corrected in the next product release. This advisory will be updated when a corrected version is available.

ABB recommends deleting the component ABBTracer which is located at: ""C:\Program Files(x86)\ABB Industrial IT\Inform IT\Components\AC-DC\ABBTracer""

Deleting this folder will not impact any functionality of IM.

Please note that the vulnerabilities can be exploited by Remote and Unauthenticated users, so customers are recommended to ensure that only authorized persons have access to plant assets and network.

Check that the usage of the Access Enable key in AC 800M and the configured access level of SIL variables corresponds to the risk analysis.

## Vulnerability details

An attacker who successfully exploited the vulnerability in the IM server, will be able to run arbitrary code. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability requires luring a user (on a host with the vulnerable IM component installed) to access a malicious website, that instructs the user's browser to load the vulnerable component, before passing it malicious input.

This could cause the Display Services functionality to stop, but it could also cause other system functionality to stop or to malfunction.

The ABBTracer component is an internal support tool and was not supposed to be in the System media.

## Mitigating factors

Successful exploitation of this vulnerability requires luring a user to a malicious website.

Recommended baseline security practices and firewall configurations can help protect a network and its attached devices from attacks that originate from outside the network. For example, common practices are for process control systems to be physically protected from direct access by unauthorized personnel, have no direct connections to the internet, and are separated from other networks by means of a firewall system that has a minimal number of ports exposed, and others that must be evaluated case by case.

Process control and automation systems should not be used for general business functions (e.g. internet browsing, email, etc.) which are not critical industrial processes. Portable computers and removable storage media should be carefully scanned for viruses before they are connected to a control system.

The ABBTracer component in Information Manager is not needed in customer installations and should not have been included in the delivery. This component will be removed from the Information Manager installation in future releases of System 800xA. This advisory will be updated when a corrected version is available.

Recommended practices include that process control systems are physically protected, have no direct connections to the Internet, and are separated from other networks by means of a firewall system that has a minimal number of ports exposed.

## Workarounds

Refer the "Recommended Immediate Actions" Section.

## Frequently asked questions

### What is the scope of the vulnerability?

An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could execute arbitrary code in the IM server.

### What causes the vulnerability?

This is caused due to ABBTracerLib component which does not properly validate input data. Moreover, this component should not have been included in the product delivery.

## **What is the Information Manager?**

Information Management functionality includes History Services for collection, online and offline storage, consolidation, and retrieval for process/lab data, alarms/events, and reports.

## **What might an attacker use the vulnerability to do?**

An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could execute arbitrary code.

## **Can functional safety be affected by an exploit of this vulnerability?**

Under certain conditions exploits of this vulnerability may affect the integrity of safety functions in System 800xA. This is however prevented if the Access Enable key in the AC 800M HI is turned Off (“disabled”) and Access Level for the variables in the safety applications are configured to “Read Only” or “Confirm and Access Enable” (see *3BNP004865\* AC 800M High Integrity Safety Manual* for more information regarding SIL Access Control and Confirmed Write Support).

With other configurations exploits of this vulnerability may affect the integrity of safety functions in System 800xA. This risk is then best avoided by following the advice in section “Recommended immediate actions” above.

It can be noted that creating malware that exploits this vulnerability and affects the integrity of a safety function will involve a substantial amount of intricate reverse engineering to circumvent the existing safety measures in AC 800M HI.

## **How could an attacker exploit the vulnerability?**

An attacker could try to exploit this vulnerability by luring a user (on a host with the vulnerable IM component installed) to access a malicious website, that instructs the user’s browser to load the vulnerable component, before passing it malicious input.

## **Could the vulnerability be exploited remotely?**

Yes, an attacker that manages to lure a user to navigate to a remote webserver with malicious content could exploit this vulnerability.

## **When this security advisory was issued, had this vulnerability been publicly disclosed?**

No, ABB received information about this vulnerability through responsible disclosure.

## **When this security advisory was issued, had ABB received any reports that this vulnerability was being exploited?**

No, ABB had not received any information indicating that this vulnerability had been exploited when this security advisory was originally issued

# **Acknowledgement**

ABB thanks William Knowles at Applied Risk for helping to identify the vulnerabilities and protecting our customers.

## Support

For additional instructions and support please contact your local ABB service organization. For contact information, see [www.abb.com/contactcenters](http://www.abb.com/contactcenters).

Information about ABB's cybersecurity program and capabilities can be found at [www.abb.com/cyber-security](http://www.abb.com/cyber-security).

## Revisions

| Rev. | Page (P)<br>Chapt. (C) | Description                                                    | Date       |
|------|------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------|------------|
| A    | all                    | New document                                                   | 2020-03-30 |
| B    | P4<br>all              | Added FAQ question on functional safety<br>Misc clarifications | 2020-04-17 |
|      |                        |                                                                |            |
|      |                        |                                                                |            |