



COMPENSATION REPORT 2025

ENGINEERED
TO OUTFIT



Letter from the Chair of the Compensation Committee

Dear Shareholders,

On behalf of the Board of Directors and the Compensation Committee, I am pleased to present the ABB Compensation Report for 2025.

Our focus at the Compensation Committee is to ensure that the compensation structure at ABB drives value creation for our shareholders, represents a motivating package for our executives, and ensures alignment with market best practices and with ABB's Sustainability Agenda.

We are committed to continuous improvement, and on an annual basis, we review our policies and disclosures. This letter summarizes the planned policy changes for year 2026, and the key compensation figures for the year 2025.

SUMMARY OF PLANNED CHANGES IN POLICIES AND DISCLOSURES

Thanks to ABB's strong progress on emissions controls over the past several years, we expect to reach our commitment to reduce emissions by 80 percent (vs. 2019 baseline) well ahead of the 2030 timeline. Hence, any future improvements to emissions reduction will be incremental and no longer represent an adequate measure for our Long-Term Incentive Plans (LTIPs). In addition, we could not identify, at this stage, alternative sustainability measures that are material, measurable and auditable to be used as a company-wide long-term target. On the other hand, we can attest that sustainability is now fully embedded in ABB's plans and processes, with clear accountability to our business leaders, and that the absence of a sustainability measure in our upcoming LTIPs in no way will hinder the focus of our leadership on the matter.

Thus, we will use the current 20 percent weighting of the emissions reduction measure to increase the focus on EPS growth, with a 60 percent weighting (previously 50 percent), and on relative TSR, with a 40 percent weighting (previously 30 percent). This change supports our ambitious financial targets and reinforces value creation for our shareholders. Our active LTIPs (2023, 2024 and 2025), which include sustainability measures, remain unchanged and will continue to run until their last vesting, in 2028.

From 2026, we will also increase the LTIP target grant size for our CEO, from 150 percent to 200 percent of annual base salary. This will bring his total compensation to market reference while strengthening the focus on long-term, performance-driven pay. During our recent interactions with shareholders we received positive feedback for the change in recognition of the need to provide a competitive package, drive pay for performance, and align with the long term interests of our shareholders.

Finally, we will tighten our share ownership requirements for the CEO and all the other Executive Committee (EC) members from 2026 onwards. The current nominal levels will remain at 500 percent and 400 percent, respectively, but the basis for the calculation will be changed from annual base salary net of taxes to annual gross base salary. This will materially increase the wealth at risk exposure to all EC members and reinforce their focus on long-term value creation for ABB's shareholders.

2025 RESULTS AND COMPENSATION POLICY OUTCOMES

2025 was a year of strong operational and financial performance. Overall, most key financial, sustainability and operational targets were met or excelled. ABB continued to grow the operational EBITA margin, increased its order book, and made significant progress in reducing its environmental footprint and contributing to a more sustainable environment. For more information on ABB's 2025 operational, financial and sustainability achievements, please refer to ABB's [Integrated Report 2025](#).

Board of Directors: the total Board compensation for the 2025–2026 term was CHF 4.22 million, which is lower than the maximum amount approved at the Annual General Meeting 2025 (CHF 4.3 million). There has been no change to the individual Board member fees since 2015.

Executive Committee: Four EC members in place at the time of ABB's annual salary review received a salary adjustment in March 2025, to address their exceptional performance and to ensure their total compensation opportunity does not fall behind their relevant market reference.

The average award for EC members under the Annual Incentive Plan (AIP) for 2025 was 114.8 percent (out of a maximum of 150 percent), compared to 119 percent in 2024. The achievement level of the 2022 LTIP, which vested in 2025, was 181.2 percent (out of a maximum of 200 percent), driven by strong evolution of ABB's EPS and sustainability targets, as well as a solid relative TSR during the last three years.

The total EC compensation was CHF 33.7 million in 2025, reflecting the strong performance-related results, as summarized in Exhibit 23, and presented in detail in Exhibit 41. This amount was significantly lower than the maximum amount (CHF 45.9 million) approved at the Annual General Meeting 2024 for the financial year 2025.

GOVERNANCE

At the Annual General Meeting, scheduled for March 19, 2026, you will be asked to vote on the maximum aggregate compensation for the Board for its 2026–2027 term and on the maximum aggregate compensation for the EC in 2027.

In 2025 we conducted a Board compensation review and, as a result, ABB will propose an adjustment to the maximum aggregate compensation for the Board, resulting from the need to correct the fee for the Chair of the Board, which has remained unchanged for 19 years, and is significantly below market reference. The other Board fees are in line with the market and do not require any correction.

The maximum aggregate compensation for the EC will decrease from the level requested for the prior year. This is primarily influenced by the change in composition of the EC, including the reduction of one position, from nine to eight members, due to the divestment of ABB's Robotics business.

Finally, this report will also be submitted for a non-binding, consultative vote by shareholders.

We have pursued an open and regular dialogue with our stakeholders, as we continue to improve our compensation system. On behalf of the Compensation Committee, I thank you for your continued trust in ABB and for your consistently supportive feedback.

Frederico Fleury Curado

Chair of the Compensation Committee

Zurich, February 18, 2026

AT A GLANCE

BOARD OF DIRECTORS (BOARD) COMPENSATION

Compensation for the 2025–2026 term of office

The total Board compensation for the 2025–2026 term of office was within the maximum amount approved at the Annual General Meeting (AGM) 2025.


Exhibit 1: Board compensation (in CHF) for the 2025–2026 term of office

Total compensation	4,220,000
Approved compensation amount	4,300,000

Share ownership of Board members

We require our Board members to be ABB shareholders by receiving at least half of their Board compensation in ABB shares. Except for the four members who joined the Board recently, most of our Board members held ABB shares on December 31, 2025, worth at least 500 percent of their 2025 Board compensation.

Exhibit 2: Board members shareholding (on December 31, 2025) in percent of their 2025 total compensation⁽¹⁾



(1) Based on share price of CHF 50.47, the 2025 Long-Term Incentive Plan (LTIP) reference price, and shares held on December 31, 2025.

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE (EC) COMPENSATION

Compensation structure during 2025

Exhibit 3: Executive Committee compensation structure during 2025

	Fixed compensation – base salary and benefits	Variable compensation – short-term incentive (AIP)	Variable compensation – long-term incentive (LTIP)	Wealth at risk/ Share ownership
Purpose and link to strategy	Facilitates attraction and retention of talented EC members; base salary compensates for the role and relevant experience; benefits protect against risk	Rewards annual ABB (the Company), business area, functional and individual performance. Aligned with the Company’s Annual Performance Plan	Rewards Company performance over a three-year period and encourages creation of long-term, sustainable value for shareholders. Aligned with the Company’s Long-Term Performance Plan	Aligns individual’s personal wealth at risk directly to the ABB share price, and EC members’ interests with those of shareholders to maintain focus on ABB’s long-term success
Operation	Salary in cash, benefits in kind, and pension contributions	Annual awards, payable in cash after a one-year performance period; malus and clawback provisions in place	Annual grants in shares which may vest after three years, and are subject to performance conditions; malus and clawback provisions in place	Individuals are required to hold ABB shares
Opportunity level (as % of base salary)	Based on scope of responsibilities, personal experience, and skillset		<p>CEO</p> <p>Other EC members⁽¹⁾</p>	<p>CEO 500% of annual salary (net of taxes)</p> <p>Other EC members 400% of annual salary (net of taxes)</p>
Performance indicators	Changes to base salary consider individual performance, future potential, broadening of responsibilities, and external benchmarking	<p>■ 90% Group financial results ■ 10% Sustainability results</p>	<p>■ 50% Average EPS ■ 30% Relative TSR ■ 20% Sustainability</p>	Exposure to ABB share price
		<p>■ 20% Group financial results ■ 70% Business area financial results ■ 10% Sustainability results</p>		

(1) EC members with legacy employment contracts have a Target LTIP grant of 100 percent and Maximum LTIP opportunity of 200 percent. The higher LTIP opportunity for the newer EC members is largely offset by lower pension and other benefit costs.

Total EC compensation for 2025

The total EC compensation was CHF 33.7 million in 2025, reflecting the strong performance-related variable pay awards.

This amount was substantially lower than the CHF 45.9 million approved at the AGM 2024 for the financial year 2025, reflecting the lower compensation levels of the newly appointed EC members, lower AIP payouts, much lower 2025 LTIP grant fair value deriving from an approximately 20 percent lower ABB share price on the grant date compared to the LTIP reference price fixed for the 2025 LTIP and lower payments to former EC members.


Exhibit 4: EC compensation (in CHF) for 2025

Total compensation	33,734,870
Maximum aggregate compensation approved at the AGM 2024	45,900,000

Compensation of EC members located outside of Switzerland was converted into Swiss Francs, applying the yearly average foreign exchange rates for the year 2025.

Exhibit 5 shows the composition of the 2025 total compensation for the EC members on December 31, 2025. The largest portion of the CEO's 2025 total compensation was performance driven (61 percent), represented by short-term and long-term incentives. For the other EC members, on an aggregate level, variable compensation represented 53 percent of their 2025 total compensation. Note that compensation paid in 2025 for former EC members is not included in Exhibit 5, which can be found in Exhibit 41 in the section "Compensation tables and share ownership tables".

Exhibit 5: 2025 total compensation mix (in CHF) for the CEO and other EC members on aggregate level⁽¹⁾




(1) Composed of 2025 base salary, 2025 AIP, 2025 LTIP grant, pension benefits, and other benefits. 2025 AIP represents accrued short-term incentive for the year 2025, which will be paid in 2026, after the publication of ABB's financial results. The sum of percentage figures may differ from 100 percent due to rounding with one decimal.

Realized EC compensation in 2025

Realized variable compensation relates to the AIP and the LTIP awards at the end of their respective performance cycles, based on achievement of the plan related annual or long-term performance measures. This additional level of transparency is designed to support stakeholder's understanding of the link between pay and performance we seek to ensure at ABB.


The average outcome of the 2025 AIP for all EC members (Exhibit 6) was above the target (114.8 percent on average), and the LTIP that vested in 2025 (2022 LTIP) exceeded the target level, with a final vesting level of 181.2 percent of target (Exhibit 7).

Exhibit 6: 2025 AIP outcome compared to target




(1) On aggregate level, while individual outcomes range from 64.8 to 128.4 percent.

Exhibit 7: 2022 LTIP outcome compared to target



Considering the variable components stated above, the realized total compensation in 2025 was above the target for all EC members, driven by strong performance and the high level of achievement against the targets for the 2022 LTIP, which vested in 2025. In addition to the high 2022 LTIP vesting level, the increase in our share price of approximately 48 percent over the vesting period has positively influenced the level of realized LTIP related compensation.

Exhibit 8: Realized total compensation in 2025 compared to target total compensation



(1) On an aggregate level, while individual outcomes range from 110 to 150 percent.

Further details related to the realized compensation of each EC member and each compensation component are specified in Exhibit 47.


Share ownership of EC members

The alignment of our EC members’ personal wealth at risk to the ABB share price and their interests with those of shareholders is important to us. Therefore, EC members may not sell their shares (except to meet tax and social security costs related to share vesting) until they achieve their personal share ownership requirement level.

Five out of nine EC members exceeded their share ownership requirements on December 31, 2025. The other four members have been appointed to the EC recently and are still in the build-up phase.

When considering the number of granted, but unvested, ABB shares of EC members on December 31, 2025, it is expected that the four recently appointed EC members who do not currently meet their share ownership requirement will do so by 2028, after vesting of their respective LTIP share grants or replacement share grants.

Exhibit 9: EC shareholding compared to share ownership guideline⁽¹⁾



(1) Based on share price of CHF 50.47, the 2025 LTIP reference price, and shares held or granted on December 31, 2025. Future allocation of granted, but unvested, shares is based on target achievement level and relevant plan specific settlement: default settlement of the final 2023 LTIP, 2024 LTIP and 2025 LTIP, and replacement share awards is 100 percent in shares. The value of shares is compared against the annual base salary net of taxes, on December 31, 2025.

COMPENSATION GOVERNANCE

We prepared this Compensation Report (Report) in accordance with the Swiss Code of Obligations, the Directive on Information relating to Corporate Governance of the SIX Exchange Regulation, and the rules of the stock market of Sweden, where ABB shares are also listed. In addition, we consider the principles of the Swiss Code of Best Practice for Corporate Governance of economiesuisse.

ABB'S ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION

ABB's Articles of Incorporation, approved by its shareholders, contain provisions on compensation which govern and outline the principles of compensation relating to our Board of Directors and Executive Committee. They are published on ABB's Corporate Governance website new.abb.com/about/corporate-governance and summarized below:

- **Compensation Committee** (Articles 28 to 31): The Compensation Committee (CC) is composed of a minimum of three members of the Board and are elected individually by the shareholders at the Annual General Meeting for a period of one year. It supports the Board in establishing and reviewing the compensation strategy and policy, determining the compensation of the Board and the EC, and in preparing the proposals to the AGM on compensation matters. The responsibilities of the CC are defined in more detail in the Board Regulations and Corporate Governance guidelines, which are published on ABB's Corporate Governance website.
- **Compensation principles** (Article 33): Compensation of the members of the Board consists of fixed compensation only, which is delivered in cash and shares (with an option to elect for shares only). Compensation of the members of the EC consists of fixed and variable compensation. Variable compensation may comprise short-term and long-term elements. Compensation may be paid in cash, shares, or other benefits.
- **"Say-on-pay" vote** (Article 34): Shareholders approve the maximum aggregate amount of compensation of the Board for the following Board term and of the EC for the following financial year.
- **Supplementary amount for new EC members** (Article 35): If the maximum approved aggregate compensation amount is not sufficient to also cover the compensation of newly appointed EC members, up to 30 percent of the last maximum approved aggregate amount shall be available as a supplementary amount to cover the compensation of such new EC members.
- **Loans** (Article 37): Loans may not be granted to members of the Board or the EC.

AUTHORITY LEVELS IN COMPENSATION MATTERS

The authority levels of the different bodies on compensation matters are detailed in Exhibit 10.

Exhibit 10: Authority levels in compensation matters				
	CEO	CC	Board	AGM
Maximum aggregate compensation amount for the EC		•	•	•
CEO compensation		•	•	
Individual compensation of other EC members	•	•		
Maximum aggregate compensation amount for the Board		•	•	•
Individual compensation of Board members		•	•	
Compensation Policy		•	•	
Compensation Report		•	•	Consultative vote

• Recommendation • Proposal • Approval

ACTIVITIES OF THE CC IN 2025

The CC meets as often as business requires but at least four times a year. In 2025, the CC held seven meetings and performed the activities described in Exhibit 11. The CEO, the Chief Human Resources Officer (CHRO) and the Head of Performance and Reward also attend all or part of the CC meetings in an advisory capacity. The Chair of the CC may decide to invite other executives upon consultation with the CEO, as appropriate. Executives do not attend the meetings or the parts of the meetings in which their own compensation and/or performance are being discussed. We provide further details in the section “Board of Directors – Meetings and attendance” of our [Corporate Governance Report 2025](#).

Exhibit 11: CC activities during 2025

Strategy

- Review of LTIP design and structure
- Continued monitoring of link between sustainability and compensation

Board compensation

- Review of compensation benchmarking for Board members (biennial activity)

EC compensation

- Review of individual compensation for EC members
- Review of the share ownership of EC members
- Review of compensation for new and departing EC members

Performance – relating to past performance cycle

- Setting of AIP design, measures and targets for 2025
- Assessment of AIP awards for 2024
- Assessment of achievement of performance targets for LTIP awards vesting in 2025

Performance – relating to forthcoming performance cycle

- Consideration of preliminary AIP measures and targets for 2026
- Setting of performance targets for LTIP grants in 2025 (vesting in 2028)
- Consideration of forecast achievement against performance targets for unvested LTIP grants

Compliance

- Review of CC annual plan
- Review of feedback from Stakeholder Engagement meetings
- Regulatory and market updates
- Review of the Compensation Report for publication
- Preparation of maximum aggregate compensation for the Board to be submitted for AGM vote
- Preparation of maximum aggregate compensation for the EC to be submitted for AGM vote

The Chair of the CC reports to the full Board regularly, usually after each CC meeting. The minutes of the CC meetings are available to the members of the Board.

The CC retains independent, external advisors for compensation matters. In 2025, the CC mandated PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) to provide these services. In addition to its CC advisory role, PwC also provided human resources, tax, and advisory services to ABB in 2025. Other external advisors were employed in 2025 by the CC and management.

SUSTAINABILITY-RELATED CONSIDERATIONS IN ABB'S COMPENSATION

Regarding the AIP for 2025, all EC members had two mandatory sustainability targets with a combined weighting of 10 percent of their target award. All EC members shared a common governance goal designed to help deliver ABB's obligations under the Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA), in line with our commitments to the US Department of Justice, while the second sustainability goal varied. The CEO and two other corporate officers had an environmental target related to scope 1 and 2 greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reduction. All business area presidents had a safety target (reduction of the Total Recordable Incident Frequency Rate - TRIFR). The CHRO had a diversity target related to an increase in the proportion of women in senior management roles and the CFO had a governance target related to internal controls.

Regarding the LTIP granted to ABB's executives in 2025, including the EC, we continued to carry a company-wide sustainability performance measure, with a weighting of 20 percent. For the 2025 LTIP, our sustainability performance measure was the Company's scope 1 and 2 GHG emissions reduction at the end of a three-year performance period, compared to the baseline of 2024.

Thanks to our strong progress on emissions control over the past several years, we expect to reach our commitment to reduce emissions by 80 percent, compared to a 2019 baseline, well ahead of the initial 2030 timeline. Hence, further improvements to emissions reduction will be incremental and no longer represent an adequate measure for our LTIP. The Company could not identify, at this stage, alternative sustainability measures that are material, measurable and auditable to be used as an adequate company-wide long-term target. In consequence our 2026 LTIP will not contain a sustainability measure. Future vesting under our 2023, 2024 and 2025 LTIP grants will remain subject to the achievement against the plan specific sustainability targets, for which the last vesting will occur in 2028. Sustainability is now fully embedded in our plans and processes, with full accountability to our business leaders.

PROGRAMS FOR ABB EMPLOYEES

In addition to the offer of fair and competitive compensation to our employees, we also strive to offer additional programs to reinforce the social contract with our employees. We summarize selected supporting key programs and their links to our Sustainability Agenda in Exhibit 12.

Exhibit 12: Selected programs for employees		
Program	Operation and purpose	Link to ABB's Sustainability Agenda
Employee Share Acquisition Plan (ESAP)	Offered to over 110,000 employees in over 60 countries, providing the opportunity to become ABB shareholders and purchase shares in ABB one year after the start of a plan, at a price which gets fixed and confirmed at the beginning of each annual plan cycle. In all ABB locations where ESAP is offered the opportunity for share ownership is the same for permanent full-time and permanent part-time employees at ABB.	Supports social goal by allowing employees to share into the Company's long-term success and aligns employees' interests with the interests of shareholders.
Parental Leave	A global and gender-neutral program, offered to all employees, which sets out a minimum standard on paid parental leave that supports all family types. The primary caregivers receive 12 weeks of paid leave and the secondary caregivers four weeks following the birth of a child or when becoming a new parent by adoption or surrogacy.	Supports social goals, promotes wellbeing and the ABB value of "Care".
Employee Assistance	A global program, offered to all employees. The program supports the employee's wellbeing by offering paid counseling on emotional health, family concerns and workplace concerns.	Supports social goals, promotes wellbeing and the ABB value of "Care".
Sustainability Allowance	Offered to selected employees based on business need or market practice, with any car provision being progressively migrated to e-vehicles or transportation allowances which can be used to contribute to public transport, cycle, or other transport needs.	Supports environmental goals by addressing changed needs related to mobility and providing greater flexibility to opt for more environmentally friendly solutions.

BOARD COMPENSATION POLICY

We design our compensation policy for the members of the Board of Directors to attract and retain experienced people to the Board. Board compensation levels consider the responsibilities, time and effort required to fulfill the respective roles on the Board and its committees.

COMPETITIVE POSITIONING OF BOARD COMPENSATION

The levels and the mix of Board members' compensation are regularly compared against the compensation of non-executive Board members from a cross-selection of publicly traded companies in Switzerland (SMI 20), excluding financial services companies. Such a review was last undertaken in 2025, with the Company peer group, which includes Alcon, Geberit, Givaudan, Holcim, Kuehne + Nagel, Logitech, Lonza, Nestle, Novartis, Richemont, Roche, Sika and Swisscom. There has been no change to the individual Board member fees since 2015, and to the Chair of the Board fee since 2007. As a result of the 2025 review, ABB will propose to shareholders at the AGM 2026 the increase of the maximum aggregate compensation for the Board, resulting from the need to adjust the compensation for the Chair of the Board, bringing it in line with the current market.

BOARD COMPENSATION STRUCTURE

A fixed fee is payable to the Chair, Vice-Chair (if appointed) and members of the Board, and additional fees are payable for chairing or membership of a Board committee, except for the Chair of the Board. Board members are paid for their service over an annual Board term that starts with their election at the AGM. Payment of fees is made in semi-annual installments in arrears.

We require our Board members to take 50 percent of their compensation in shares, while they may elect to receive 100 percent in shares. The number of shares delivered is calculated prior to each semi-annual fee payment by dividing the monetary amount to which the Board members are entitled by the average closing price of the ABB share over a predefined 30-day period. The delivered shares are subject to a three-year restriction period during which they cannot be sold, transferred, or pledged. Any restricted shares are unblocked when a Board member leaves the Board.

BOARD FEES BY ROLE

For the term of office from the AGM 2025 to the AGM 2026, there was no adjustment made to Board fees, as set out in Exhibit 13. No Vice-Chair was appointed for that term of office.

Exhibit 13: Board fees (in CHF) by role	
Chair of the Board ⁽¹⁾	1,200,000
Member of the Board	290,000
Additional committee fees:	
Chair of Finance, Audit and Compliance Committee	110,000
Chair of Compensation Committee or Chair of Governance and Nomination Committee	60,000
Member of Finance, Audit and Compliance Committee	40,000
Member of Compensation Committee or Member of Governance and Nomination Committee	30,000

(1) The Chair of the Board does not receive any additional committee fees.

IMPLEMENTATION OF BOARD COMPENSATION POLICY

TOTAL BOARD COMPENSATION

The compensation paid to the Board members for the calendar year 2025 and for the term of office from the AGM 2025 to the AGM 2026 are disclosed in Exhibit 14 below.

At the AGM 2025, the shareholders approved a maximum aggregate compensation amount of CHF 4.30 million for the 2025–2026 Board term. This amount is lower than the approved amount for the previous Board term. The Board compensation to be paid for the 2025–2026 Board term is CHF 4.22 million and is therefore within the amount approved by the shareholders.

Exhibit 14: Board compensation (in CHF)		
Board of Directors	Board term	
	2025–2026	2024–2025
Number of members	10	10
Total compensation	4,220,000	4,250,000
Maximum aggregate compensation amount approved at previous AGM	4,300,000	4,400,000

We disclose amounts by individual Board member in Exhibit 15 below, and in Exhibits 38 and 39, respectively, in the section “Compensation tables and share ownership tables”.

BOARD FEES BY MEMBER

The following Exhibit 15 sets out the total compensation by member for the 2025–2026 Board term.

Exhibit 15: Board compensation by member (in CHF) for the 2025–2026 term of office						
Name	Board	Compensation Committee	Finance, Audit and Compliance Committee	Governance and Nomination Committee	Total Compensation	
Peter Voser ⁽¹⁾	1,200,000	-	-	-	1,200,000	
David Constable ⁽²⁾	290,000	30,000	-	-	320,000	
Frederico Curado ⁽³⁾	290,000	60,000	-	-	350,000	
Johan Forssell ⁽²⁾	290,000	-	-	30,000	320,000	
Denise Johnson ⁽²⁾	290,000	-	40,000	-	330,000	
Jennifer Xin-Zhe Li ⁽²⁾	290,000	30,000	-	-	320,000	
Geraldine Matchett ⁽²⁾	290,000	-	-	30,000	320,000	
David Meline ⁽³⁾	290,000	-	110,000	-	400,000	
Claudia Nemat ⁽²⁾	290,000	-	40,000	-	330,000	
Mats Rahmström ⁽²⁾	290,000	-	40,000	-	330,000	
Total					4,220,000	

(1) Chair of the Board, who does not receive any additional committee fee as Chair of the Governance and Nomination Committee.

(2) Member of a Committee.

(3) Chair of a Committee.

COMPENSATION OF FORMER BOARD MEMBERS

In 2025, we did not make any payment to former Board members other than those disclosed in this Report.

COMPENSATION FOR SERVICES RENDERED

In 2025, we did not pay any fees or compensation to Board members for services rendered to ABB other than those disclosed in this Report.

SHARE OWNERSHIP OF BOARD MEMBERS

The members of the Board collectively owned less than one percent of ABB's total shares outstanding on December 31, 2025.

Exhibit 2 in the section "At a glance" shows the wealth at risk for each Board member, comparing the value of shares held on December 31, 2025, with the total compensation for the 2025–2026 term of office. Except for four members who joined the Board recently, all our Board members held ABB shares on December 31, 2025, worth at least 500 percent of their 2025 Board compensation.

Exhibit 40 in the section "Compensation tables and share ownership tables" shows the number of ABB shares held by each Board member on December 31, 2025, and 2024. Except as described in Exhibit 40, no member of the Board and no person closely linked to a member of the Board held any shares of ABB.

EXTERNAL MANDATES HELD BY BOARD MEMBERS

Except for one member who joined our Board in 2025, all other Board members held at least one external mandate in other companies, as detailed in the following Exhibit 16.

Exhibit 16: Board members with external mandates on December 31, 2025 (audited)

Name	Company	Listed company	2025 new mandate vs 2024	Mandate
Peter Voser	IBM Corporation, Armonk, United States of America	•		Member of the Board of Directors Chairman of the Audit Committee Member of the Board's Executive Committee
	Temasek Holdings (Private) Limited, Singapore, Singapore			Member of the Board of Directors Chairman of the Risk & Sustainability Committee Member of the Leadership & Compensation Committee
	PSA International Pte Ltd, Singapore, Singapore			Group Chairman of the Board of Directors
David Constable	Fluor Corporation, Irving, United States of America	•		Chairman of the Board of Directors Chairman of the Board's Executive Committee
Frederico Curado	Transocean Ltd., Zug, Switzerland	•		Member of the Board of Directors Chairman of the Governance, Safety and Environment Committee
	LATAM Airlines Group, Santiago, Chile	•		Member of the Board of Directors Chairman of the Audit Committee Chairman of the Strategy Committee Member of the Compensation Committee
Johan Forssell	Atlas Copco AB, Nacka, Sweden	•		Member of the Board of Directors Member of the Audit Committee
	Wärtsilä Oyj Abp, Helsinki, Finland	•		Member of the Board of Directors
	Epiroc AB, Stockholm, Sweden	•		Member of the Board of Directors Member of the Remuneration Committee
Denise Johnson	Caterpillar Inc., Deerfield, United States of America	•		Group President, Resource Industries
Jennifer Xin-Zhe Li	Changcheng Investment Partners, Beijing, China			Founder and General Partner
	SAP SE, Walldorf, Germany	•		Member of the Board of Directors Chairwoman of the Audit and Compliance Committee Member of the Finance and Investment Committee
	Full Truck Alliance Co. Ltd., Guizhou / Nanjing, China	•		Member of the Board of Directors Chairwoman of the Audit Committee
Geraldine Matchett	Nestlé S.A., Vevey, Switzerland	•		Member of the Board of Directors Member of the Audit Committee
	Swiss Re Ltd, Zurich, Switzerland	•		Member of the Board of Directors Member of the Governance, Nomination and Sustainability Committee Member of the Risk Committee
David Meline	HP Inc., Palo Alto, United States of America	•		Member of the Board of Directors Chairman of the Audit Committee Member of the Finance, Investment and Technology Committee
	Lonza Group Ltd, Basel, Switzerland	•	•	Member of the Board of Directors Member of the Audit Committee Member of the Remuneration Committee
	Eikon Therapeutics, Inc., Millbrae, United States of America		•	Member of the Board of Directors
Mats Rahmström	Piab Group AB, Danderyd, Sweden		•	Chairman of the Board of Directors
	AB SKF, Gothenburg, Sweden	•	•	Vice Chair of the Board of Directors
	Investor AB, Stockholm, Sweden	•		Member of the Board of Directors
	Quantum Industries AB, Astorp, Sweden			Member of the Board of Directors
	SMD Logistics AB, Stockholm, Sweden			Member of the Board of Directors

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE COMPENSATION POLICY

Our EC compensation policy reflects ABB's commitment to attract, motivate and retain people with the skills and experience necessary to strengthen its position as a leading global technology company.

EC COMPENSATION STRUCTURE

Our EC compensation structure is designed to be competitive, based on performance, and to encourage executives to deliver outstanding results and create sustainable shareholder value without taking excessive risks. Our EC compensation framework therefore balances fixed and variable compensation. Variable compensation is provided through short-term and long-term incentives based on strategic, financial and sustainability related targets, recognizing Group, business area and corporate function performance, as well as individual performance.


This structure is linked to our strategy and is illustrated in Exhibit 3 in the section "At a glance".

A significant portion of total compensation depends on variable pay components, which require the achievement of challenging performance targets, in alignment with ABB's Annual and Long-Term Performance Plans.

- The target AIP award is defined as a percentage of base salary, currently 100 percent for all EC members. If performance is below defined thresholds on all financial, sustainability and individual performance measures, there is no award under the AIP. When performance exceeds targets, the maximum award is capped at 150 percent of the targeted award.
- The target LTIP grant size is defined as a percentage of base salary, currently 150 percent for the CEO and 100 to 150 percent for other EC members. If performance is below defined thresholds for all applicable measures, there is no award under the LTIP. When performance exceeds targets, the maximum award is capped at 200 percent of the conditional grant.

The Exhibit below shows the impact of the application of the new compensation policy introduced in 2022, which provides a greater emphasis on variable pay, especially reflected in the long-term component.

Exhibit 17: Policy for target compensation mix of EC members (excluding CEO) appointed prior to and after 2022⁽¹⁾



(1) Policy changes for new EC entrants (excluding the CEO), applying an entry level salary of CHF 700,000 and an incumbent age of 50 years to reflect the pension benefits. Note that, by exception, the new mix of target compensation was not applied to the newly appointed Chief Communications and Sustainability Officer, where a target LTIP of 100 percent of base salary was applied.

COMPETITIVE POSITIONING OF EC COMPENSATION

The Board and the CC consider competitive market data when setting the compensation policy for the EC. It is also one of several factors in positioning the target compensation for individual EC members which include:

- individual profile of the EC member in terms of experience and skills;
- individual performance and potential;
- market value of the role (compensation benchmarking).

Comprehensive EC compensation benchmark reviews are performed every other year. The CC conducted the last review in 2024, considering three distinct peer groups.

While each of these peer groups used in the benchmarking exercise matched the size, scope or complexity of ABB, and excluded companies from the financial services sector, the application of a specific peer group depends on the nature of the role and the source of relevance. For example, our Board places a stronger emphasis on the Global Industry Group for operational roles and in compensation design, and on the Pan-European Market peer group for functional roles. In all cases, the other two peer groups are used to stress test the findings of the primary peer group (see the summary in Exhibit 18 below).

Exhibit 18: Peer groups for EC compensation benchmarking

Peer group	Composition	Companies	Rationale
Global Industry Group	A tailored group of 15 global industry peer companies, matching the scale and complexity of ABB	AB SKF, Alstom, Airbus, Atlas Copco, Denso, Eaton, Emerson Electric, Honeywell, Mitsubishi Electric, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Schneider Electric, Schindler, Siemens, Thermo Fisher Scientific, Traton	Focus for CEO role and business area roles and for benchmarking compensation design
Pan-European Market	A panel of 54 cross-industry European companies, matching the scale and complexity of ABB	See footnote (1)	Focus for corporate officer roles; continuity and stability of data points
Swiss Market	A panel of 16 Swiss headquartered companies, matching the scale and complexity of ABB	Adecco, Geberit, Givaudan, Glencore, Holcim, Kuehne & Nagel, Nestle, Novartis, Richemont, Roche, Schindler, SGS, Sika, STMicroelectronics, Swatch, Swisscom	Swiss location of headquarters

(1) AB InBev, Adidas, Air Liquide, Airbus, Associated British Foods, AstraZeneca, Atlas Copco, BAE Systems, Bayer, Bouygues, British American Tobacco, Compass Group, Continental, CRH, Danone, Endesa, Ericsson, EssilorLuxottica, Fresenius, Fresenius Medical Care, GlaxoSmithKline, Heidelberg Materials, Heineken, Henkel, Hennes & Mauritz, Holcim, Iberdrola, Imperial Brands, Industria de Diseno Textil, Jeronimo Martins, Kuehne + Nagel, Linde, L'Oreal, Michelin, National Grid, Naturgy Energy Group, Nokia, Novartis, Novo Nordisk, OMV, Philips, Rio Tinto, Safran, Saint Gobain, Sanofi, SAP, Schneider Electric, Siemens, Thales, Umicore, Unilever, Veolia Environment, Vinci and Vodafone.

It is the intention to position target compensation for individual EC members between the median and upper quartile of the relevant peer group(s) considering the other factors referenced above (e.g., the EC member's skills, experience, performance and potential).

The comparison of ABB to its compensation benchmarking peer groups is shown in Exhibit 19. This data shows that ABB is typically positioned around the median of key comparator indicators (market capitalization, revenues, and number of employees) against the Global Industry Group and Pan-European Market peer group, and around the upper quartile of the Swiss Market peer group. The next EC compensation benchmarking review is planned to take place in 2026.

Exhibit 19: Comparison of ABB to compensation benchmarking peer groups			
	Market capitalization⁽¹⁾⁽²⁾⁽³⁾⁽⁴⁾	Revenues⁽¹⁾⁽²⁾⁽⁴⁾⁽⁵⁾	Number of employees⁽¹⁾⁽⁵⁾⁽⁶⁾
ABB	90.5	27.1	107,900
Global Industry Group			
Upper Quartile	112.8	39.3	148,514
Median	54.5	30.9	95,000
Lower Quartile	27.4	15.8	74,052
Pan-European Market			
Upper Quartile	94.3	38.5	134,156
Median	44.3	28.7	89,288
Lower Quartile	20.3	22.0	63,390
Swiss Market			
Upper Quartile	63.0	30.1	77,899
Median	35.4	17.3	57,386
Lower Quartile	23.2	10.3	33,588

(1) Data are sourced from Thomson Reuters and London Stock Exchange Group.

(2) Market capitalization and revenues are in CHF billions.

(3) Market capitalization is averaged over a period of three months (June 9, 2024, to September 9, 2024).

(4) All currencies have been converted to CHF, where needed, applying full-year average currency exchange rates based on the period from July 1, 2023, to June 30, 2024.

(5) Revenues and number of employees as per last financial year prior to October 2024.

(6) Number of employees in full-time equivalent (FTE) unless FTE information was not available, then in total number of employees.

COMPENSATION ELEMENTS

For each compensation element (base salary and benefits, short-term incentive, and long-term incentive) we set out the operation, the opportunity level and the performance measures in Exhibit 3 of the section “At a glance”. This section provides further details for each compensation element.

Fixed compensation – base salary and benefits

Base salary is paid in cash. Benefits consist primarily of retirement, insurance and healthcare plans that are designed to provide a reasonable level of support for the employees and their dependents in case of retirement, disability or death.

Base salary is set with reference to the scope of responsibilities, personal experience and skills, and competitive market data. Over time, base salary is adjusted considering the executive’s performance and future potential

Benefit plans are set in line with the local competitive and legal environment and are, at a minimum, in accordance with the legal requirements of the respective country.

Short-term incentive (variable compensation) – Annual Incentive Plan (AIP)

The AIP opportunity levels for the EC are 100 percent of base salary at target, with a maximum opportunity of 150 percent.

We structured the AIP to incentivize operational delivery and underpin our performance culture. As such, it is focused on our annual key priorities, with a maximum of six measures.

- A collaborative Group financial measure with a 20 to 30 percent weighting.
- Up to four Group or business area financial measures, with a 60 to 70 percent weighting.
- One or two sustainability performance measures with a weighting of 10 percent.

A summary of the composition and total weighting of the measures for all EC members is set out in Exhibit 20.

Exhibit 20: Composition and weighting of AIP measures for EC members		
	CEO and corporate officers⁽¹⁾	Business area presidents
Collaborative Group financial measure	30%	20%
Other Group financial measures	Up to three measures 60%	n.a.
Business area financial measures	n.a.	Up to four measures 70%
Sustainability measures	Two goals or targets 10%	Two goals or targets 10%
Total	100%	100%

(1) Corporate officers include Chief Financial Officer, Chief Human Resources Officer, General Counsel and Company Secretary, and Chief Communications and Sustainability Officer.

For each measure, a target level, corresponding to the expected level of performance that will generate a target (100 percent) award, will be set. For each measure, a minimum level of performance, below which there is no award (threshold), and a maximum level of performance, above which the award is capped at 150 percent of the target (maximum) award, will also be set.

The payment conditions for financial AIP measures are summarized in Exhibit 21. For Group and business area financial measures, the award percentage-achievements between threshold and target level, as well as between target and maximum level are determined by linear interpolations between these award points.

Exhibit 21: Payment conditions for the AIP of EC members				
Level of performance	Below threshold	Threshold	Target	Maximum
Award achievement per measure	0%	>0%	100%	150%

The outcomes of the financial AIP measures are subject to appropriate discretionary upward or downward adjustments by the CC for non-operational items and other adjustment principles agreed with the Board, if and to the extent the CC considers this appropriate.

In addition, the CC/Board have discretionary authority to adjust the results and/or the AIP award. This specifically includes a downwards adjustment based on safety performance, including fatalities.

Since 2024, our AIP for EC members is subject to malus and clawback provisions, which include illegal activities, any financial misstatement and reputational damage that have a material impact on ABB Ltd or one of our subsidiaries. This means that the Board may decide not to award any unpaid AIP award (malus) to EC members or may seek to recover AIP compensation that has been settled in the past (clawback) to EC members. The clawback provision applies for a period of up to three years following the date that any AIP award was paid.

Long-term incentive (variable compensation) – Long-Term Incentive Plan (LTIP)

In 2025, we offered the LTIP, exclusively in the form of Performance Share Unit (PSU) grants, to approximately 90 executives. The LTIP described in this Report represents the PSU plan and as such is applicable to EC members. In addition, we offered another LTIP in the form of Restricted Share Unit (RSU) grants to approximately 500 senior leaders and approximately 380 selected key employees below the executive cadre.

From 2026, we will extend the use of PSUs further down into the organization, covering all our executives and senior leaders (approximately 590), while maintaining RSUs for approximately 380 selected key employees.

For the CEO, the annual LTIP opportunity level is 150 percent of base salary at target, with a maximum opportunity of 300 percent of base salary.

As a result of the policy change announced in our Compensation Report 2021, the annual target and maximum opportunity levels for EC members range from 100 to 200 percent of annual base salary (old policy application) and from 150 to 300 percent of annual base salary (new policy), respectively.

The CC conducted a review of ABB's long-term incentive arrangements in 2025 to ensure they remain aligned with our business requirements and market best practices. As a result, the Board approved to increase the LTIP target grant size for the CEO from 150 percent to 200 percent of annual base salary, as of 2026, which will further align his compensation with the market and strengthen the focus on long-term performance driven pay.

Our Board has the discretionary option not to make any grants in certain circumstances.

The relative opportunity level under our LTIP offering is the same for permanent full-time and permanent part-time employees.

The LTIP has, since 2022, three performance measures with the following relative weighting:

Earnings Per Share (EPS) – 50 percent weighting

- Achievement against this measure is determined by ABB's average EPS over a three-year period. The average EPS result is calculated from the sum of the EPS for each of the three relevant years, divided by three.
- EPS is defined as diluted earnings per share attributable to ABB shareholders, calculated using Income from continuing operations, net of tax, unless the Board elects to calculate using Net income for a particular year.
- Appropriate threshold (zero), target (100 percent) and maximum (200 percent) award points are reviewed by the CC on an annual basis.
- Performance target and award points are set using our Long-Term Performance Plan and are calibrated with an independent "outside-in" view, considering the growth expectations, risk profile, investment levels and profitability levels that are typical for the industry.
- Adjustments to the outcome of the EPS achievement level may be considered for items which are not part of, or the result of, the normal course of business operations and/or which were not considered, either by way of inclusion or exclusion, for the target-setting of a specific LTIP launch. Only the net impact of such adjustments over the vesting period of the respective LTIP grant will be considered. The impact of share buybacks will not be considered as an adjustment. The same number of outstanding shares applicable at the time of the EPS target-setting will also be applied at the time of vesting.

Total Shareholder Return (TSR) – 30 percent weighting

- The TSR calculations are made for the reference period beginning in the year of the conditional grant of the shares and ending three years later. The evaluation is performed by an independent third party.
- Achievement against this measure is determined by ABB's relative TSR performance over the three-year vesting period against a defined peer group, which currently includes 3M, Atlas Copco, Eaton, Emerson Electric, GE Vernova, Honeywell Intl., Johnson Controls, Legrand, Mitsubishi Electric, Rockwell Automation, Safran, Schneider Electric, Siemens, Yokogawa Electric, and WEG.
- The threshold point for awards, above which vesting starts, corresponds to the 50th percentile (P50) of the TSR peer group, i.e., there is no vesting for performance below P50.
- Vesting for P50 achievement equals to 100 percent of target and vesting for a 75th percentile (P75) achievement level remains at 200 percent of target (maximum). There is a linear vesting for an achievement between P50 and P75 (100 to 200 percent of target).
- The constituents of the peer group and the appropriate threshold, target and maximum award points are reviewed by the CC on an annual basis.

Sustainability – 20 percent weighting

- The Board determines, on an annual basis, the LTIP specific sustainability measure(s), as well as related target(s) and award points, to incentivize material progress towards our Sustainability Agenda commitments.
- Appropriate threshold (zero), target (100 percent) and maximum (200 percent) award points are reviewed and approved by the CC on an annual basis.
- Adjustments to the outcome of the sustainability achievement may be considered for items which are not part of, or the result of the normal course of business operations and/or which were not considered, either by way of inclusion or exclusion, for the target-setting of a specific LTIP launch. Only the net impact of such adjustments over the vesting period of the respective LTIP grant will be considered.

The number of shares to be granted is determined by dividing the relevant grant value in Swiss Francs by the average ABB share price on the SIX Swiss Exchange over the period of 20 trading days prior, and 20 trading days after, the date of publication of ABB's full year financial results. Settlement of the LTIP shares is three years after grant, subject to achievement of performance conditions, defined prior to grant.

The vesting schedule for the LTIP is shown in the following Exhibit 22. The award percentage achievements between threshold and target, as well as between target and maximum, are determined by linear interpolations between these award points.

Exhibit 22: Vesting schedule for the LTIP of EC members				
Level of performance	Below threshold	Threshold⁽¹⁾	Target	Maximum
Award achievement per measure	0%	>0%	100%	200%

(1) For the TSR measure, the threshold point equals the target point.

The CC has the discretion to adjust the formulaic LTIP vesting outcome to reflect the overall performance of ABB, over the performance period.

Default settlement of the final LTIP award is 100 percent in shares with an automatic sell-to-cover in place for employees who are subject to withholding taxes.

Our LTIP share grants are subject to malus and clawback provisions, which include illegal activities, any financial misstatement and reputational damage that have a material impact on ABB Ltd or one of its subsidiaries. This means that the Board may decide not to award any unsettled or unvested LTIP grants (malus) or may seek to recover LTIP awards that have been settled in the past (clawback). The clawback provision applies for a period of up to five years following the originally scheduled plan specific vesting date.

The CC also has the ability to suspend the delivery of awards if it is likely that the Board will determine that the malus or clawback provisions may potentially apply (e.g., if the employee is subject to an external investigation).

In the event of a change of control, there is no automatic accelerated vesting of LTIP awards.

Participants are entitled to receive a cash amount (a “dividend equivalent payment”) on each vested award share that is equal to the total dividends per share paid by the Company on the ABB Ltd share between the grant date and the delivery date of the vested award.

Wealth at risk / Share ownership

EC members are normally required to retain all vested shares from their LTIP grants and from any other share-based compensation until they meet their share ownership requirement. In circumstances where there is a withholding tax obligation, the number of shares received will be the number of shares vested minus the shares sold under the default sell-to-cover facility.

The share ownership requirement is equivalent to a multiple of the EC member’s annual base salary, net of taxes (see Exhibit 3 in the section “At a glance”). These share ownership requirements are aligned with market practice and result in a wealth at risk for each EC member which is aligned with shareholder interests.

Only vested shares owned by an EC member and their spouse count for the comparison of the actual share ownership against the share ownership requirement.

The CC reviews the status of EC share ownership on an annual basis. As a result of the 2025 review, the CC decided to further tighten the share ownership requirement for our CEO and other EC members. To strengthen the market alignment further, the calculation basis for the share ownership requirement will, from 2026, be annual gross base salary instead of annual base salary net of taxes. The share ownership requirement percentages (500 percent for CEO and 400 percent for other EC members) will remain the same. With the implementation of the new share ownership requirements ABB increases the wealth at risk exposure to its EC members and management’s focus on long-term value creation for ABB’s shareholders.

Notice period, severance provisions and non-competition clauses

Employment contracts for EC members include a notice period of 12 months, during which they are entitled to their annual base salary, short-term incentive, and benefits. In accordance with Swiss law and ABB’s Articles of Incorporation, the contracts for the EC members do not allow for any severance payment.

Non-compete agreements may be entered into with the CEO and all other EC members for a period of 12 months after their employment. Compensation for such agreements, if any, may not exceed the EC member’s last total annual cash remuneration (comprising of base salary, short-term incentive and benefits).

IMPLEMENTATION OF EC COMPENSATION POLICY

TOTAL COMPENSATION OVERVIEW

The total EC compensation was CHF 33.7 million in 2025, reflecting solid performance-related variable pay awards and the change in composition of the EC, as summarized in Exhibit 23, and presented in detail in Exhibits 41 and 42.

The actual compensation of CHF 33.7 million paid to EC members in 2025 was substantially lower than the amount of CHF 45.9 million approved at the AGM 2024 for the financial year 2025. This was mainly due to the lower compensation and benefits levels of the newly appointed EC members in 2024, lower AIP payouts, much lower 2025 LTIP grant fair value deriving from an approximately 20 percent lower ABB share price on the grant date compared to the LTIP reference price fixed for the 2025 LTIP and lower payments to former EC members.

	Calendar year	
	2025	2024
Base salaries	7,851,520	8,650,473
Pension benefits	2,972,088	3,895,706
Other benefits ⁽²⁾	5,495,359	6,345,842
Total fixed compensation	16,318,967	18,892,021
Short-term incentives ⁽³⁾	9,113,170	10,306,621
Long-term incentives (fair value at grant)	8,302,733	11,742,706
Replacement share grants	n.a.	3,573,566
Total variable compensation	17,415,903	25,622,893
Total compensation	33,734,870	44,514,914
Maximum aggregate compensation approved at the AGM 2024 and 2023, respectively	45,900,000	43,900,000
Maximum aggregate compensation plus 30 percent of such amount in accordance with Art. 35 of ABB Ltd's Articles of Incorporation	n.a.	57,070,000

(1) Compensation of Brandon Spencer was converted from USD to CHF applying an average foreign exchange rate of 0.8303, and compensation of Giampiero Frisio was converted from EUR to CHF applying an average foreign exchange rate of 0.9369. For an overview of compensation by individual and component, please refer to Exhibits 41 and 42 in the section "Compensation tables and share ownership tables". An overview of 2025 realized compensation by individual is provided in Exhibit 47 in the same section.

(2) Other benefits mainly comprise payments related to social security, dividend equivalent payments, health insurance, transportation, tax advice and certain other items.

(3) Represents accrued short-term variable compensation for the year 2025, which will be paid in 2026, after the publication of ABB's financial results. Short-term variable compensation is linked to the targets and goals defined in each EC member's Annual Incentive Plan.

COMPENSATION MIX

The ratio of fixed to variable compensation in any given year depends on the performance of the Company and individual EC members against predefined performance targets.

In Exhibit 5 in the section "At a glance" we show the composition of the total annual compensation in 2025 for the CEO and for the other current EC members on an aggregate level, specifying the split of its five compensation components. Note that compensation paid in 2025 for former EC members is not included in Exhibit 5. This can be found in Exhibit 41 in the section "Compensation tables and share ownership tables".

COMPENSATION ELEMENTS – 2025 HIGHLIGHTS

Base salary

As a result of the regular compensation review for the EC, the Board and the CC decided to increase the salaries of four of the nine EC members in place in March 2025. The base salary of Peter Terwiesch was increased by 2.9 percent to CHF 885,000, that of Sami Atiya was increased by 3.1 percent to CHF 825,000, that of Giampiero Frisio by 10.0 percent to EUR 885,500 and that of Brandon Spencer by 15.0 percent to USD 885,500. These salary changes were made to ensure their total compensation opportunity does not fall behind their relevant target market position and also consider their strong performance.

Considering that the other five EC members in place in March 2025 had no salary adjustments, this corresponded to an average 3.4 percent increase on annual base salaries for the EC members post March 2025.

Annual Incentive Plan (AIP)

Under the 2025 AIP, all EC members had one collaborative Group measure, Group Operational EBITA margin, with a 20 percent weighting for the business area presidents and a 30 percent weighting for the CEO and the corporate officers.

In addition to this collaborative Group measure, the CEO and the corporate officers shared other Group measures, including Revenues, Free Cash Flow conversion to Net Income and Return on Capital employed (ROCE), with a total weighting of 60 percent.

All business area presidents had, in addition to the collaborative Group measure, three or four measures which were tailored to business imperatives, with a total weighting of 70 percent, including Operational EBITA margin, Revenues, Net working capital (13 months % avg) and Operational revenue gross profit productivity growth.

In Exhibit 24 we show the composition and weighting of the financial measures applied in 2025 for all EC members under their AIP, specified by their roles. Definitions of the financial measures applied for all EC members are set out in Exhibit 25.

Exhibit 24: Composition and weighting of 2025 AIP measures for EC members

	Performance measure	CEO and corporate officers ⁽¹⁾	President Electrification	President Motion	President Process Automation	President Robotics & Discrete Automation
Collaborative Group financial measure	Op EBITA margin	30%	20%	20%	20%	20%
Other Group financial measures	Revenues	30%				
	Free Cash Flow conversion to Net Income	20%				
	ROCE	10%				
Business area financial measures	Revenues		25%	30%	15%	
	Op EBITA margin		25%	20%	30%	30%
	Net working capital (13 months % avg)		10%	10%	15%	25%
	Operational revenues gross profit productivity growth		10%	10%	10%	15%
Sustainability measures	Safety, GHG emissions, Female leaders, Internal controls	5%	5%	5%	5%	5%
	Governance	5%	5%	5%	5%	5%
Total		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

(1) Corporate officers include Chief Financial Officer, Chief Human Resources Officer, General Counsel and Company Secretary, and Chief Communications and Sustainability Officer.

Exhibit 25: Definition of financial measures applied under the 2025 AIP for EC members

Measure	Description
Operational EBITA margin (%) ⁽¹⁾	Operational EBITA, which is Operational earnings before interest, tax, and acquisition-related amortization, as a percentage of Operational revenues, which is total revenues adjusted for foreign exchange/commodity timing differences in total revenues.
ROCE (%) ⁽¹⁾	Return on Capital employed (ROCE) is calculated as Operational EBITA after tax, divided by the average of the period's opening and closing Capital employed, adjusted to reflect impacts from the timing of significant acquisitions/divestments occurring during the period.
Revenues	Amount of consolidated revenues recognized during the year in accordance with USGAAP.
Free Cash Flow conversion to Net Income ⁽¹⁾	Free cash flow conversion to net income is calculated as free cash flow divided by net income attributable to ABB adjusted for gains or losses arising on sale of certain businesses and certain other significant items within net income which are also excluded / adjusted for when calculating operating cashflows.
Operational revenue gross profit productivity growth (%)	Operational revenue gross profit productivity is calculated as the 12-month rolling operational revenue gross profit divided by the average number of total workforce in the last three months. Where operational revenue gross profit is calculated as gross profit (as defined under USGAAP) adjusted for the following non-operational items to the extent that they are included within the USGAAP gross profit amount: (i) foreign exchange/commodity timing differences, (ii) acquisition-related amortization, (iii) restructuring, related and implementation costs, (iv) changes in obligations related to divested businesses, (v) changes in pre-acquisition estimates, (vi) acquisition- and divestment-related expenses and integration costs, (vii) other income/expense relating to the Power Grids joint venture and (viii) certain other non-operational items. Growth is the change in productivity over the same period a year earlier, represented as a percentage change.
Net working capital (13 months % avg)	Average Net working capital ⁽¹⁾ over 13 consecutive month-ends (December 2024 through December 2025), expressed as a percentage of Operational revenues ⁽¹⁾ . Calculated using constant exchange rates.

(1) For additional information, see "Supplemental reconciliations and definitions" in the Q4 2025 Financial Information booklet available on our Investor Relations website.

All EC members also had two sustainability performance measures with a five percent weighting per measure. While all EC members shared the same governance goal designed to help deliver the Deferred Prosecution Agreement in line with our commitments to the US Department of Justice, the second goal varied. The CEO and two other corporate officers had an environmental target related to scope 1 and 2 GHG emissions reduction. All business area presidents had a social target related to reduction of the Total Recordable Incident Frequency Rate (TRIFR), the CHRO had a social target related to an increase in the proportion of women in senior management roles, and the CFO had a governance target related to internal controls.

We detail the 2025 AIP achievements for all EC members in Exhibits 26 and 27.

Exhibit 26: 2025 AIP outcomes for the CEO and the corporate officers (rounded)

Category	Measure (and weighting)	Target and award points and actual achievement levels		
		Threshold (0%)	Target (100%)	Maximum (150%)
Collaborative Group financial measure 30%	Group Op EBITA margin 30%			118%
Other Group financial measures 60%	Revenues 30%			130%
	Free Cash Flow conversion to Net Income 20%			106%
	ROCE 10%			136%
Sustainability measures 10%	Governance, GHG emissions, Female leaders, Internal controls 10%			114%-145%

2025 AIP outcomes for the business area presidents (rounded)

Category	Measure (and weighting)	Target and award points and actual achievement levels		
		Threshold (0%)	Target (100%)	Maximum (150%)
Collaborative Group financial measure 20%	Group Op EBITA margin 20%			118%
Business area financial measures 70%	Revenues 15-30%			79%-150%
	Op EBITA margin 20-30%			0%-127%
	Net working capital (13 months % avg) 10-25%			101%-150%
	Operational revenues gross profit productivity growth 10-15%			0%-150%
Sustainability measures 10%	Governance, Safety 20%			108%-150%

● = Actual achievement (dot) or range of Actual achievements (line between minimum and maximum dot)
 ● = Median achievement for the applicable range

Exhibit 27: Overview of targeted and realized 2025 AIP values

	Collaborative Group measure			Other Group measures			Business area measures			Sustainability measures			Total AIP outcome percentage (in % of target) ⁽¹⁾	Target AIP award (in CHF)	Actual AIP award (in CHF) ⁽²⁾
	Achievement	Weighting	Outcome	Achievement	Weighting	Outcome	Achievement	Weighting	Outcome	Achievement	Weighting	Outcome			
Morten Wierod	117.8%	30%	35.3%	122.9%	60%	73.8%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	127.5%	10%	12.7%	121.8%	1,500,000	1,827,000
Timo Ihamuotila	117.8%	30%	35.3%	122.9%	60%	73.8%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	145.0%	10%	14.5%	123.6%	990,000	1,223,640
Carolina Granat	117.8%	30%	35.3%	122.9%	60%	73.8%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	113.9%	10%	11.4%	120.5%	725,000	873,625
Mathias Gärtner	117.8%	30%	35.3%	122.9%	60%	73.8%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	127.5%	10%	12.7%	121.8%	800,000	974,400
Karin Lepasoon	117.8%	30%	35.3%	122.9%	60%	73.8%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	127.5%	10%	12.7%	121.8%	600,000	730,800
Sami Atiya	117.8%	20%	23.6%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	37.4%	70%	26.2%	150.0%	10%	15.0%	64.8%	825,000	534,600
Peter Terwiesch	117.8%	20%	23.6%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	125.3%	70%	87.7%	150.0%	10%	15.0%	126.3%	885,000	1,117,755
Brandon Spencer ⁽³⁾	117.8%	20%	23.6%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	93.7%	70%	65.6%	150.0%	10%	15.0%	104.2%	735,231	766,111
Giampiero Frisio ⁽³⁾	117.8%	20%	23.6%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	134.3%	70%	94.0%	107.8%	10%	10.8%	128.4%	829,625	1,065,239
Total														7,889,856	9,113,170

(1) The Total AIP outcome percentage figures may differ from the sum of the outcome percentage figures per measure due to rounding with one decimal.

(2) Represents accrued AIP award for the year 2025, which will be paid in 2026, after the publication of ABB's financial results.

(3) Compensation of Brandon Spencer was converted from USD to CHF applying an average foreign exchange rate of 0.8303, and compensation of Giampiero Frisio was converted from EUR to CHF applying an average foreign exchange rate of 0.9369.

CEO retrospective AIP target disclosure

In 2023, we introduced an additional level of transparency on the alignment between the CEO's pay and performance, in response to shareholder feedback. The following Exhibit 28 sets out target and award points for each measure under the CEO's 2025 AIP and the related composition of the final award level.

Exhibit 28: 2025 AIP outcomes for the CEO (rounded)⁽¹⁾


Category	Performance measure	Weight	Target (100% award)	Actual	Award (% of target)	Weighted award
Collaborative Group financial measure	Op EBITA margin (%)	30%	18.6	18.9	117.8%	35.3%
Other Group financial measures	Revenues (\$ in millions)	30%	34,687	35,201	129.6%	38.9%
	Free Cash Flow conversion to Net Income (%)	20%	95.0	96.5	106.2%	21.2%
	ROCE margin (%)	10%	23.4	24.3	136.4%	13.6%
Sustainability measures	Scope 1 and 2 GHG emissions (kt)	5%	132.2	131.8	104.9%	5.2%
	Delivery of Deferred Prosecution Agreement	5%	This is a qualitative goal ⁽²⁾		150.0%	7.5%
Total						121.8%

(1) The computation of targets as well as the measurement of actual performance against those targets are based on foreign exchange rates set prior to the start of the performance period. Therefore, targets and actuals under the AIP do not agree with the equivalent measure calculated based on the actual results as presented in ABB's Consolidated Financial Statements. The sum of weighted award percentages may differ from the total weighted award due to rounding with one decimal.

(2) The goal represents the contribution to the delivery of our commitments under the Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA) with the US Department of Justice related to the Kusile project.

CEO AIP outcomes in the last five years

In Exhibit 29, we show the historical AIP award outcomes for our CEO over the last 5 years. Over this time, the payout averaged 131.3 percent of target and 87.5 percent of the maximum award.

Exhibit 29: CEO AIP historical award percentages⁽¹⁾

(1) These refer to Björn Rosengren for the period from 2021 to 2023, and to Morten Wierod for the years 2024 to 2025.

Long-Term Incentive (LTIP)

2025 LTIP grants

The estimated value at grant of the share-based grants to EC members on December 31, 2025, under the 2025 LTIP was CHF 8.3 million, compared with CHF 11.7 million in 2024 granted to EC members on December 31, 2024, under the 2024 LTIP.

The reference price for the 2025 LTIP grant used to determine the number of shares granted to participants was CHF 50.47.

The 2025 LTIP is based on three performance measures: our EPS, our TSR and a sustainability measure.

We consider targets and award points under the EPS measure as commercially sensitive information and will only disclose these retrospectively after the end of the relevant LTIP performance period.

As in the previous year, we kept the achievement of the EPS threshold point challenging for the 2025 LTIP by applying a range between the EPS target and award points of minus 11.4 percent of target for the threshold and plus 11.4 percent of target for the maximum, to reflect the perceived EPS volatility during the performance period.

The peer companies approved by the Board to determine our relative TSR performance for the 2025 LTIP are as set out in the previous section “Executive Committee compensation policy” on page 22.

The sustainability measure applied to the 2024 LTIP was also carried forward to the 2025 LTIP, namely the scope 1 and 2 GHG emissions reduction at the end of the three-year performance period (2025–2027), compared to the 2024 baseline. The sustainability targets and award points under the 2025 LTIP have been structured to reflect our progress to date, its long-term ambitions, and that as the targets get higher, the overall stretch to achieve them is even more challenging. Details of the long-term GHG emissions reduction targets can be found in our [Sustainability Statement 2025](#).

The target and award points for all performance measures under the 2025 LTIP are illustrated in Exhibit 30.

Exhibit 30: 2025 LTIP target and award points

Measure	Weighting	Threshold	Target	Maximum
Average EPS	50%	Target point -11.4%	Disclosed after performance period ⁽¹⁾	Target point +11.4%
Relative TSR	30%	50 th percentile	50 th percentile	75 th percentile
Reduction of total scope 1 and 2 CO ₂ equivalent emissions compared to 2024	20%	6.1%	14.5%	22.9%

Below threshold point: no award;

At target point: 100 percent award;

At or above maximum point: capped at 200 percent award;

Linear interpolations between award points;

(1) The average EPS target is not prospectively disclosed for reasons of commercial sensitivity.

2026 LTIP grants

The CC conducted a review of ABB's long-term incentive arrangements during 2025 to ensure they remain aligned with our business requirements and market best practices. Based on ABB's excellent emissions reduction achievements over the previous four years, the published 2030 target is expected to be reached well ahead of the initial 2030 timeline. In consequence any future improvements related to GHG emissions reduction will be incremental only. The Company did not identify an alternative meaningful sustainability measure for which ambitious targets can be set at this point in time. Our long-term incentive plans from 2023, 2024 and 2025 are unchanged and will continue to consider sustainability targets until end of 2027, with the last vesting occurring in April 2028.

The 2026 LTIP will have two performance measures with the following relative weighting:

- EPS with 60 percent weighting, and
- TSR with 40 percent weighting.

2022 LTIP – achievements

The final number of shares vesting under the 2022 LTIP grant in 2025 was determined based on the achievement level against the predefined EPS, TSR and sustainability targets.

The three-year average EPS amounted to \$1.96, which led to a vesting level of 200.0 percent (previous year: 200.0 percent) out of a potential 200 percent, net of adjustments for items considered outside the normal course of business operation and/or which were not considered in the target-setting of the 2022 LTIP. Adjustments were made to the EPS for each of the relevant financial years to reflect significant unplanned developments after the LTIP grant, both positive and negative, mainly including for the impact of divestments, M&A-related integration and restructuring costs.

The relative ranking of ABB's TSR measure against the predefined peer group of companies for the 2022 LTIP sat in the 62nd percentile, which led to a vesting level of 149.4 percent (previous year: 200.0 percent) out of a potential of 200 percent.

The reduction of GHG emissions by the end of 2024 in comparison to the 2019 baseline was 78.2 percent, which led to a vesting level of 182.0 percent (previous year: n.a.) out of a potential of 200 percent.

As a result, the average weighted achievement level of the three performance measures under the 2022 LTIP was 181.2 percent (out of a maximum 200 percent), as specified in Exhibit 31

In line with our commitment to retrospectively disclose the EPS performance targets for vested LTIP awards, the three relevant award points (threshold, target and maximum) as well as the actual achievement for the adjusted average EPS performance measure are also displayed in Exhibit 31 below.

Exhibit 31: Target point, award points (rounded) and achievement levels of 2022 LTIP performance measures					
Measure	Weighting	Threshold	Target	Maximum	Actual
Average EPS (\$)	50%	1.44	1.61	1.78	1.96
Achievement level		0%	100%	200%	200.0%
Relative TSR	30%	50 th percentile	50 th percentile	75 th percentile	62 nd percentile
Achievement level		0%	100%	200%	149.4%
Sustainability	20%	60.0%	70.0%	80.0%	78.2%
Achievement level		0%	100%	200%	182.0%
Award as percentage of target (maximum at 200%)					181.2%

In the following Exhibit 32 we compare the previously disclosed "fair value" of each EC member's 2022 LTIP grant and the actual value of their respective award at the time of vesting in 2025. This indicates the average realized 2022 LTIP value was 277.9 percent of the grant fair value. The values presented are gross and before payment of any applicable taxes owed by the recipient.

Exhibit 32: Realized value of 2022 LTIP grant for current EC members

	Grant date	Shares granted related to the EPS measure ⁽¹⁾	Number of shares granted related to the TSR measure ⁽²⁾	Number of shares granted related to the sustainability measure ⁽³⁾	Total number of shares granted	Disclosed grant fair value (CHF) ⁽⁴⁾	Vesting date	Vesting percentage	Number of vested shares	Realized value (CHF) ⁽⁵⁾
Morten Wierod ⁽⁶⁾	April 25, 2022	14,368	8,620	5,748	28,736	810,519	April 25, 2025	181.2%	52,070	2,252,028
Timo Ihamuotila	April 25, 2022	15,804	9,482	6,323	31,609	891,570	April 25, 2025	181.2%	57,276	2,477,187
Carolina Granat	April 25, 2022	11,574	6,944	4,630	23,148	652,920	April 25, 2025	181.2%	41,945	1,814,122
Mathias Gärtner	n.a.						n.a.			
Karin Lepasoon	April 25, 2022	9,578	5,747	3,832	19,157	540,336	April 25, 2025	181.2%	34,713	1,501,338
Sami Atiya	April 25, 2022	12,771	7,662	5,110	25,543	720,548	April 25, 2025	181.2%	46,284	2,001,783
Peter Terwiesch	April 25, 2022	13,250	7,950	5,301	26,501	747,485	April 25, 2025	181.2%	48,020	2,076,865
Brandon Spencer ⁽⁷⁾⁽⁸⁾	April 25, 2022	4,770	2,862	1,909	9,541	269,113	April 25, 2025	181.2%	17,289	747,750
Giampiero Frisio ⁽⁸⁾	April 25, 2022	7,202	4,321	2,881	14,404	406,279	April 25, 2025	181.2%	26,101	1,128,668
Total						5,038,770				13,999,741

(1) Actual achievement level of the EPS measure was 200.0 percent.

(2) Actual achievement level of the TSR measure was 149.4 percent.

(3) Actual achievement level of the sustainability measure was 182.0 percent.

(4) Valued at CHF 28.21, the grant fair value of the ABB share on the grant date.

(5) Valued at CHF 43.25, the closing price of the ABB share on the day of vesting.


(6) Morten Wierod's 2022 LTIP grant related to his role as business area president Motion.

(7) Valued at CHF 43.2423, the monthly average price of the ABB share on the day of vesting.

(8) At the time of 2022 LTIP grant, Brandon Spencer and Giampiero Frisio were not members of the EC.

LTIP vesting outcomes in the last five years

The historical LTIP vesting outcomes for the prior five years are shown in Exhibit 33 below. Over the last five years, the average LTIP vesting was 149.8 percent of the target award and 75.7 percent of the maximum award.


Exhibit 33: LTIP historical actual vesting percentages⁽¹⁾

(1) According to plan-specific relative weighting of relevant performance measures.

REALIZED TOTAL COMPENSATION – 2025

We disclose the realized total compensation for each EC member. Such transparency on realized compensation is designed to foster stakeholders' understanding of ABB's link between pay and performance. Realized compensation relates to the AIP award and the LTIP award at the end of their respective performance cycles, reflecting the actual payment and settlement, based on achievements of the plan specific performance measures. Exhibit 34 sets out a high-level comparison of realized and target total compensation for each EC member. We provide further details in Exhibit 47 in the section "Compensation tables and share ownership tables" of this Report.

Exhibit 34: Realized 2025 total compensation (in CHF) compared to target total compensation



OTHER COMPENSATION – 2025

Members of the EC are eligible to participate in the Employee Share Acquisition Plan (ESAP), a savings plan based on stock options, which is open to our employees around the world. Three members of the EC participated in the ESAP in 2025. EC members who participated will, upon vesting, each be entitled to acquire up to 170 ABB shares at CHF 59.40 per share, the market share price at the start of the 2025 plan.

For a more detailed description of the ESAP, please refer to "Note 19 – Share-based payment arrangements" in our [Financial Report 2025](#).

In 2025, ABB did not pay any fees or compensation to the members of the EC for services rendered to ABB other than those disclosed in this Report. Except as disclosed in the section "Executive Committee – Business relationships between ABB and its EC members" in our [Corporate Governance Report 2025](#), the Company did not pay any additional fees or compensation in 2025 to persons closely linked to a member of the EC for services rendered to ABB.

SHARE OWNERSHIP OF EC MEMBERS

Five out of nine EC members exceeded their share ownership requirements. The other four members have been appointed to the EC recently. The individual shareholding in comparison to the relevant share ownership requirement is shown in Exhibit 9 in the section "At a glance".

The EC members collectively owned less than one percent of ABB's total shares outstanding on December 31, 2025.

On December 31, 2025, EC members held ABB shares and conditional rights to receive shares, as shown in Exhibit 45 in the section "Compensation tables and share ownership tables". Their holdings on December 31, 2024, are shown in Exhibit 46 in the same section.

Except as described in Exhibits 45 and 46, no member of the EC and no person closely linked to a member of the EC held any shares of ABB or options on ABB shares on December 31, 2025, and 2024.

EXTERNAL MANDATES HELD BY EC MEMBERS

Three out of nine EC members held at least one external mandate in other companies, as detailed in the following Exhibit 35.

Exhibit 35: EC members with external mandates on December 31, 2025 (audited)				
Name	Company	Listed company	2025 new mandate vs 2024	Mandate
Timo Ihamuotila	Nokia Oyi, Espoo, Finland	•	•	Vice Chairman of the Board of Directors Member of the Corporate Governance and Nomination Committee Member of the Strategy Committee
	Kone Oyi, Helsinki, Finland	•		Member of the Board of Directors Member of the Audit Committee
	Oras Invest Oy, Helsinki, Finland			Member of the Board of Directors
Sami Atiya	SGS SA, Geneva, Switzerland	•		Member of the Board of Directors Chairman of the Remuneration Committee Member of the Nomination Committee
Peter Terwiesch	Hilti AG, Schaan, Liechtenstein			Member of the Board of Directors

CHANGES APPLICABLE TO EC MEMBERS

TERMS OF APPOINTMENT FOR EC MEMBERS

The new Chief Financial Officer, Christian Nilsson, was appointed as per February 1, 2026, with an annual base salary of CHF 775,000, a target short-term incentive of 100 percent of annual base salary and a target long-term incentive of 150 percent of annual base salary. Christian Nilsson is eligible for standard EC benefits.

TERMS OF DEPARTURE FOR EC MEMBERS

The Chief Financial Officer, Timo Ihamuotila, stepped down from the EC as per January 31, 2026, and will retire on October 15, 2026. He will receive compensation and benefits up to the point of his departure, including eligibility to a pro-rated short-term incentive payment for 2026. His unvested shares granted under our LTIP will be treated according to contractual terms.

The business area president Robotics & Discrete Automation, Sami Atiya, stepped down from the EC as per December 31, 2025, and will depart from ABB on December 31, 2026. He is entitled to receive compensation and benefits up to the point of his departure. This includes a short-term incentive payment for 2026. His unvested shares granted under our LTIP will be treated according to contractual terms.


COMPENSATION OF FORMER EC MEMBERS

In 2025, we did not make any payment to former EC members other than those disclosed in this Report.

VOTES ON COMPENSATION AT THE AGM 2026

As illustrated in Exhibit 36, the Board's proposals to shareholders at the AGM 2026 will relate to Board compensation for the 2026–2027 term of office and EC compensation for the calendar year 2027. There will also be a non-binding consultative vote on the Compensation Report 2025, i.e., on this Report.

Exhibit 36: Shareholders will have three separate votes on compensation at the AGM 2026




The voting results at ABB's AGM in 2025 were as follows:

- Maximum aggregate Board compensation for the 2025–2026 term of office – 97.37 percent approved
- Maximum aggregate EC compensation for 2026 – 93.97 percent approved
- Consultative vote on the Compensation Report 2024 – 92.82 percent voted for

In determining the proposed maximum aggregate EC compensation for 2027, the Board intends to take into consideration the criteria set forth in Exhibit 37. Given the variable nature of a major portion of the compensation components, the proposed maximum aggregate EC compensation will accordingly be higher than the actual compensation paid or awarded, as it must cover the potential maximum value of each component of compensation.

The decrease in maximum aggregate EC compensation for 2027 compared to 2026 is mainly influenced by the lower number of EC members, the application of the adjusted, more performance-oriented compensation mix for EC entrants and the anticipated costs related to the vesting of 2024 LTIP awards.

Exhibit 37: Overview of key factors affecting the determination of maximum aggregate EC compensation**Assumptions**

AIP award percentage	150%	150%	115% ⁽²⁾	100%	150%	150%	150%
Adjustment of LTIP grant size	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Number of LTIP shares potentially vesting in year ⁽³⁾	354,869	301,476	n.a.	n.a.	270,833	195,716	253,016
Number of EC members	9	9	9	9	9	9	8

(1) Figure will be provided in the AGM 2026 invitation.

(2) Average outcome without the allocation of former EC members. For a full description, see previous section "Compensation elements – 2025 highlights".

(3) For example, 253,016 LTIP shares were granted to the EC in 2024, that potentially vest in 2027 subject to performance conditions. While 253,016 shares represent the LTIP target vesting award, the actual number of awarded shares can be zero to 200 percent of target.

COMPENSATION TABLES AND SHARE OWNERSHIP TABLES

Exhibit 38: Board compensation in 2025 and 2024 (audited)

Name	Paid in 2025					Paid in 2024				
	November Board term 2025–2026		May Board term 2024–2025		Total compensation paid in 2025 ⁽²⁾	November Board term 2024–2025		May Board term 2023–2024		Total compensation paid in 2024 ⁽²⁾
	Settled in cash ⁽¹⁾	Settled in shares – number of shares received ⁽²⁾	Settled in cash ⁽¹⁾	Settled in shares – number of shares received ⁽²⁾		Settled in cash ⁽¹⁾	Settled in shares – number of shares received ⁽²⁾	Settled in cash ⁽¹⁾	Settled in shares – number of shares received ⁽²⁾	
CHF	CHF	CHF	CHF	CHF	CHF	CHF	CHF	CHF	CHF	
Peter Voser, Chair ⁽⁴⁾	—	10,265	—	11,743	1,200,000	—	12,022	—	13,754	1,200,000
Jacob Wallenberg ⁽⁵⁾	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	112,500	1,859	225,000
Gunnar Brock ⁽⁶⁾	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	165,000	—	165,000
David Constable ⁽⁷⁾	80,000	1,095	80,000	1,253	320,000	80,000	1,283	80,000	1,468	320,000
Frederico Curado ⁽⁸⁾	—	2,186	—	2,610	350,000	—	2,666	—	3,058	350,000
Lars Förberg ⁽⁹⁾	—	—	—	2,999	160,000	—	3,183	—	3,649	320,000
Johan Forssell ⁽¹⁰⁾	80,000	1,095	80,000	1,253	320,000	80,000	1,283	—	—	160,000
Denise Johnson ⁽¹¹⁾	—	2,307	—	2,640	330,000	—	2,702	—	3,092	330,000
Jennifer Xin-Zhe Li ⁽¹²⁾	—	1,992	—	2,610	335,000	—	2,666	87,500	1,490	350,000
Geraldine Matchett ⁽¹³⁾	80,000	1,317	82,500	1,599	325,000	82,500	1,634	82,500	1,873	330,000
David Meline ⁽¹⁴⁾	100,000	1,369	100,000	1,567	400,000	100,000	1,604	100,000	1,835	400,000
Claudia Nemat ⁽¹⁵⁾	82,500	1,084	—	—	165,000	—	—	—	—	—
Mats Rahmström ⁽¹⁶⁾	82,500	1,130	82,500	1,293	330,000	82,500	1,323	—	—	165,000
Total	505,000	23,840	425,000	29,567	4,235,000	425,000	30,366	627,500	32,078	4,315,000

(1) Represents gross amount paid, prior to deductions for social security, pension payments, withholding tax, etc.

(2) Number of shares per Board member is calculated based on net amount due after deductions for social security, pension payments, withholding tax, etc.

(3) In addition to the Board remuneration stated in the above table, in 2025 and 2024 the Company paid CHF 296,659 and CHF 282,230, respectively, in related mandatory social security payments. Additionally, in 2025 the Company paid CHF 20,058 in related mandatory pension payments.

(4) Chair of the ABB Ltd Board and of the Governance and Nomination Committee for the 2023–2024, 2024–2025 and 2025–2026 Board terms; is receiving 100 percent of his compensation in the form of ABB shares.

(5) Vice-Chair of the ABB Ltd Board and member of the Governance and Nomination Committee for the 2023–2024 Board term; received 50 percent of his compensation in the form of ABB shares. Did not stand for re-election in 2024.

(6) Member of the Finance, Audit and Compliance Committee for the 2023–2024 Board term; received 50 percent of his compensation in the form of ABB shares, except for his final compensation payment which was delivered after he had stepped down from the Board and which he received 100 percent in cash. Did not stand for re-election in 2024.

(7) Member of the Compensation Committee for the 2023–2024, 2024–2025 and 2025–2026 Board terms; is receiving 50 percent of his compensation in the form of ABB shares.

(8) Chair of the Compensation Committee for the 2023–2024, 2024–2025 and 2025–2026 Board terms; is receiving 100 percent of his compensation in the form of ABB shares.

(9) Member of the Governance and Nomination Committee for the 2023–2024 and 2024–2025 Board terms; received 100 percent of his compensation in the form of ABB shares. Did not stand for re-election in 2025.

(10) Member of the Governance and Nomination Committee for the 2024–2025 and 2025–2026 Board terms; is receiving 50 percent of his compensation in the form of ABB shares.

(11) Member of the Finance, Audit and Compliance Committee for the 2023–2024, 2024–2025 and 2025–2026 Board terms; is receiving 100 percent of her compensation in the form of ABB shares.

(12) Member of the Compensation Committee for the 2023–2024, 2024–2025 and 2025–2026 Board term and member of the Governance and Nomination Committees for the 2023–2024 and 2024–2025 Board terms; received 50 percent of her compensation in the form of ABB shares for the 2023–2024 and 2024–2025 Board terms and is receiving 100 percent of her compensation in the form of ABB shares for the 2025–2026 Board term.

(13) Member of the Finance, Audit and Compliance Committee for the 2023–2024, 2024–2025 and 2025–2026 Board terms; is receiving 50 percent of her compensation in the form of ABB shares.

(14) Chair of the Finance, Audit and Compliance Committee for the 2023–2024, 2024–2025 and 2025–2026 Board terms; is receiving 50 percent of his compensation in the form of ABB shares.

(15) Member of the Finance, Audit and Compliance Committee for the 2025–2026 Board term; is receiving 50 percent of her compensation in the form of ABB shares.

(16) Member of the Finance, Audit and Compliance Committee for the 2024–2025 and 2025–2026 Board terms; is receiving 50 percent of his compensation in the form of ABB shares.

Exhibit 39: Board compensation for the Board terms 2025–2026 and 2024–2025 (audited)

Name	Specific Board roles	Board term 2025–2026	Board term 2024–2025
		CHF	CHF
Peter Voser	Chair of the Board and Chair of the GNC for 2025–2026 and 2024–2025 terms	1,200,000	1,200,000
David Constable	Member of the CC for 2025–2026 and 2024–2025 terms	320,000	320,000
Frederico Curado	Chair of the CC for 2025–2026 and 2024–2025 terms	350,000	350,000
Lars Förberg	Member of the GNC for 2024–2025 term	—	320,000
Johan Forssell	Member of the GNC for 2025–2026 and 2024–2025 terms	320,000	320,000
Denise Johnson	Member of the FACC for 2025–2026 and 2024–2025 terms	330,000	330,000
Jennifer Xin-Zhe Li	Member of the CC for 2025–2026 term and Member of the CC and Member of the GNC for 2024–2025 term	320,000	350,000
Geraldine Matchett	Member GNC for 2025–2026 term and Member FACC for 2024–2025 term	320,000	330,000
David Meline	Chair of the FACC for 2025–2026 and 2024–2025 terms	400,000	400,000
Claudia Nemat	Member of the FACC for 2025–2026 term	330,000	—
Mats Rahmström	Member of the FACC for 2025–2026 and 2024–2025 terms	330,000	330,000
Total		4,220,000	4,250,000

Key:

CC: Compensation Committee

FACC: Finance, Audit and Compliance Committee

GNC: Governance and Nomination Committee

Exhibit 40: Board ownership of ABB shares (audited)

Name	Total number of shares held	
	December 31, 2025	December 31, 2024
Peter Voser	228,660	206,652
David Constable	51,418	49,070
Frederico Curado	67,701	62,905
Lars Förberg	N.a.	86,927
Johan Forssell	3,631	1,283
Denise Johnson	14,670	9,723
Jennifer Xin-Zhe Li	54,570	49,968
Geraldine Matchett	42,446	39,530
David Meline ⁽¹⁾	44,937	51,387
Claudia Nemat	1,084	N.a.
Mats Rahmström ⁽²⁾	7,281	4,858
Total	516,398	562,303

(1) Includes 3,150 shares held by spouse.

(2) Includes 735 shares held by family members.

Exhibit 41: EC compensation in 2025 (audited)

Name	Cash Compensation					Estimated value of share-based grants under the 2025 LTIP ⁽⁴⁾	Total compensation (incl. conditional share-based grants) ⁽⁵⁾
	Base salary	Short-term incentive ⁽¹⁾	Pension benefits	Other benefits ⁽²⁾	Total cash-based compensation ⁽³⁾		
	CHF	CHF	CHF	CHF	CHF		
Morten Wierod	1,500,007	1,827,000	288,696	572,438	4,188,141	1,881,319	6,069,460
Timo Ihamuotila	990,004	1,223,640	545,180	716,984	3,475,808	827,796	4,303,604
Carolina Granat	725,012	873,625	446,719	522,951	2,568,307	606,204	3,174,511
Mathias Gärtner	800,009	974,400	181,531	381,304	2,337,244	1,003,391	3,340,635
Karin Lepasoon	600,000	730,800	259,774	347,315	1,937,889	501,717	2,439,606
Sami Atiya	820,841	534,600	508,162	565,255	2,428,858	689,844	3,118,702
Peter Terwiesch	880,837	1,117,755	517,127	615,502	3,131,221	740,020	3,871,241
Brandon Spencer ⁽⁶⁾	716,788	766,111	66,207	94,727	1,643,833	1,006,598	2,650,431
Giampiero Frisio ⁽⁶⁾	818,022	1,065,239	158,692	117,321	2,159,274	1,045,844	3,205,118
Total EC members on December 31, 2025	7,851,520	9,113,170	2,972,088	3,933,797	23,870,575	8,302,733	32,173,308

- (1) Represents accrued short-term variable compensation for the year 2025, which will be paid in 2026, after the publication of ABB's financial results. Short-term variable compensation is linked to the targets and goals defined in each EC member's Annual Incentive Plan. Upon full achievement of these targets and goals, the short-term variable compensation of the EC members represents 100 percent of their respective base salary.
- (2) Other benefits mainly comprise payments related to social security, dividend equivalent payments, health insurance, transportation, tax advice and certain other items.
- (3) Prepared on an accrual basis.
- (4) The estimated value of the share-based LTIP grants is based on the price of ABB shares on the grant date. On the day of vesting (April 21, 2028), the value of the share-based awards granted under the LTIP may vary from the above amounts due to changes in ABB's share price and the outcome of the performance factors.
- (5) In addition, an amount of CHF 1,561,562 was paid in 2025 to former EC members, representing mainly social security premium and dividend equivalent payments due on the 2022 LTIP vesting, and tax advisory services for income related to their former EC role.
- (6) Compensation of Brandon Spencer was converted from USD to CHF applying 0.8303, representing the average foreign exchange rate over 2025. Compensation of Giampiero Frisio was converted from EUR to CHF applying 0.9369, representing the average foreign exchange rate over 2025.

Exhibit 42: EC compensation in 2024 (audited)

Name	Cash Compensation					Estimated value of share-based grants under the 2024 LTIP ⁽⁴⁾	Estimated value of replacement share-based grant in 2024 ⁽⁵⁾	Total compensation (incl. conditional share-based grants)
	Base salary	Short-term incentive ⁽¹⁾	Pension benefits	Other benefits ⁽²⁾	Total cash-based compensation ⁽³⁾			
	CHF	CHF	CHF	CHF	CHF	CHF	CHF	CHF
Morten Wierod (CEO as of August 1, 2024)	1,193,754	1,518,775	404,221	673,195	3,789,945	2,829,060	—	6,619,005
Timo Ihamuotila	990,004	1,234,530	531,616	831,765	3,587,915	1,154,192	—	4,742,107
Carolina Granat	725,012	892,475	434,077	589,626	2,641,190	845,235	—	3,486,425
Mathias Gärtner (EC member as of November 1, 2024)	133,335	164,134	28,714	27,952	354,135	1,586,900	3,573,566	5,514,601
Karin Lepasoon	600,000	738,600	255,540	140,638	1,734,778	699,506	—	2,434,284
Sami Atiya	800,009	459,200	491,512	647,603	2,398,324	932,690	—	3,331,014
Peter Terwiesch	860,004	1,159,280	498,421	685,234	3,202,939	1,002,644	—	4,205,583
Brandon Spencer (EC member as of August 1, 2024) ⁽⁶⁾⁽⁷⁾	278,387	367,750	—	40,780	686,917	1,261,951	—	1,948,868
Giampiero Frisio (EC member as of August 1, 2024) ⁽⁷⁾	314,956	423,302	32,343	48,570	819,171	1,430,528	—	2,249,699
Total EC members on December 31, 2024	5,895,461	6,958,046	2,676,444	3,685,363	19,215,314	11,742,706	3,573,566	34,531,586
Björn Rosengren (EC member until July 31, 2024) ⁽⁸⁾	1,785,006	2,154,495	753,339	1,759,261	6,452,101	—	—	6,452,101
Andrea Antonelli (EC member until May 31, 2023) ⁽⁸⁾	350,000	283,300	121,566	155,889	910,755	—	—	910,755
Tarak Mehta (EC member until July 31, 2024) ⁽⁸⁾	620,006	910,780	344,357	745,329	2,620,472	—	—	2,620,472
Total departing EC members	2,755,012	3,348,575	1,219,262	2,660,479	9,983,328	—	—	9,983,328
Total	8,650,473	10,306,621	3,895,706	6,345,842	29,198,642	11,742,706	3,573,566	44,514,914

- (1) Represents accrued short-term variable compensation for the year 2024, which was paid in 2025, after the publication of ABB's 2024 financial results. Short-term variable compensation is linked to the targets and goals defined in each EC member's Annual Incentive Plan. Upon full achievement of these targets and goals, the short-term variable compensation of the EC member represents 100 percent of their respective base salary. Andrea Antonelli and Tarak Mehta received a short-term variable compensation payment in 2024 at the time of their departure related to their termination period, in accordance with the contractual obligations of ABB.
- (2) Other benefits mainly comprise payments related to social security, health insurance, children's education, transportation, tax advice, compensation for foregone dividends on replacement share grants and certain other items.
- (3) Prepared on an accrual basis.
- (4) The estimated value of the share-based LTIP grants is based on the price of ABB shares on the grant date. On the day of vesting (April 22, 2027), the value of the share-based awards granted under the LTIP may vary from the above amounts due to changes in ABB's share price and the outcome of the performance factors.
- (5) The estimated value of the share-based replacement grant is based on the closing price of ABB shares on the grant date. On the vesting dates (November 1, 2025, 2026 and 2027), the value of the share-based awards granted under the replacement share grant may vary from the above amounts due to changes in ABB's share price and the outcome of the performance factors.
- (6) For Brandon Spencer the maximum pension contributions for the year 2024 were already reached prior to his promotion to the EC. Therefore, no additional pension contributions were provided in 2024.
- (7) Compensation of Brandon Spencer was converted from USD to CHF applying an average foreign exchange rate of 0.8677, and compensation of Giampiero Frisio was converted from EUR to CHF applying an average foreign exchange rate of 0.9390.
- (8) EC members who stepped down from the EC during 2024 continued to receive compensation and benefits up to the point of their departure, according to contractual terms, which are included in their total compensation.

Exhibit 43: LTIP grants in 2025 (audited)

Name	Reference number of shares under the EPS performance factor of the LTIP grant ⁽¹⁾	Total estimated value of share-based grants under the EPS performance factor of the LTIP grant ⁽²⁾⁽³⁾	Reference number of shares under the TSR performance factor of the LTIP grant ⁽¹⁾	Total estimated value of share-based grants under the TSR performance factor of the LTIP grant ⁽²⁾⁽³⁾	Reference number of shares under the sustainability performance factor of the LTIP grant ⁽¹⁾	Total estimated value of share-based grants under the sustainability performance factor of the LTIP grant ⁽²⁾⁽³⁾	Total number of reference shares granted under the LTIP grant ⁽¹⁾⁽²⁾	Total estimated value of share-based LTIP grants ⁽²⁾⁽³⁾
	CHF	CHF	CHF	CHF	CHF	CHF	CHF	CHF
Morten Wierod ⁽⁴⁾	22,290	940,638	13,374	564,383	8,917	376,298	44,581	1,881,319
Timo Ihamuotila	9,808	413,898	5,884	248,305	3,924	165,593	19,616	827,796
Carolina Granat	7,182	303,081	4,309	181,840	2,874	121,283	14,365	606,204
Mathias Gärtner	11,888	501,674	7,133	301,013	4,756	200,704	23,777	1,003,391
Karin Lepasoon ⁽⁴⁾	5,944	250,837	3,566	150,486	2,379	100,394	11,889	501,717
Sami Atiya	8,173	344,901	4,904	206,949	3,270	137,994	16,347	689,844
Peter Terwiesch ⁽⁴⁾	8,768	370,010	5,260	221,972	3,508	148,038	17,536	740,020
Brandon Spencer	11,926	503,278	7,155	301,941	4,772	201,379	23,853	1,006,598
Giampiero Frisio	12,391	522,901	7,434	313,715	4,958	209,228	24,783	1,045,844
Total EC members on December 31, 2025	98,370	4,151,218	59,019	2,490,604	39,358	1,660,911	196,747	8,302,733

(1) Vesting date April 21, 2028.

(2) The reference number of shares of the EPS, TSR and sustainability performance factors are valued using the fair value of the ABB shares on the grant date.

(3) Default settlement of the final LTIP award is 100 percent in shares, with an automatic sell-to-cover in place for employees who are subject to withholding taxes. The plan foresees a maximum award of 200 percent of the number of reference shares granted based on the achievement against the predefined average EPS, relative TSR and sustainability performance targets. Participants are also entitled to receive a dividend equivalent payment at the time of vesting for each awarded share.

(4) In addition to the above awards, three members of the EC participated in the 22nd launch of the ESAP in 2025, which will allow them to save over a 12-month period and, in November 2026, use their savings to acquire ABB shares under the ESAP. Each EC member who participated in ESAP will, upon vesting, be entitled to acquire up to 170 ABB shares at an exercise price of CHF 59.40 per share.

Exhibit 44: LTIP grants in 2024 (audited)

Name	Reference number of shares under the EPS performance factor of the LTIP grant ⁽¹⁾	Total estimated value of share-based grants under the EPS performance factor of the LTIP grant ⁽²⁾⁽³⁾	Reference number of shares under the TSR performance factor of the LTIP grant ⁽¹⁾	Total estimated value of share-based grants under the TSR performance factor of the LTIP grant ⁽²⁾⁽³⁾	Reference number of shares under the sustainability performance factor of the LTIP grant ⁽¹⁾	Total estimated value of share-based grants under the sustainability performance factor of the LTIP grant ⁽²⁾⁽³⁾	Total number of reference shares granted under the LTIP grant ⁽¹⁾⁽²⁾	Total estimated value of share-based grants under the LTIP grant ⁽²⁾⁽³⁾
		CHF		CHF		CHF		CHF
Morten Wierod (CEO as of August 1, 2024) ⁽⁴⁾	29,754	1,414,506	17,852	848,685	11,903	565,869	59,509	2,829,060
Timo Ihamuotila	13,092	577,096	7,855	346,249	5,237	230,847	26,184	1,154,192
Carolina Granat	9,587	422,595	5,752	253,549	3,836	169,091	19,175	845,235
Mathias Gärtner (EC member as of November 1, 2024)	15,869	793,450	9,521	476,050	6,348	317,400	31,738	1,586,900
Karin Lepasoon ⁽⁴⁾	7,934	349,731	4,760	209,821	3,175	139,954	15,869	699,506
Sami Atiya	10,579	466,323	6,347	279,776	4,233	186,591	21,159	932,690
Peter Terwiesch ⁽⁴⁾	11,373	501,322	6,823	300,758	4,550	200,564	22,746	1,002,644
Brandon Spencer (EC member as of August 1, 2024)	13,272	630,951	7,963	378,562	5,310	252,438	26,545	1,261,951
Giampiero Frisio (EC member as of August 1, 2024)	15,045	715,240	9,027	429,144	6,019	286,144	30,091	1,430,528
Total EC members on December 31, 2024	126,505	5,871,214	75,900	3,522,594	50,611	2,348,898	253,016	11,742,706

(1) Vesting date April 22, 2027.

(2) The reference number of shares of the EPS, TSR and sustainability performance factors are valued using the fair value of the ABB shares on the grant date.

(3) Default settlement of the final LTIP award is 100 percent in shares, with an automatic sell-to-cover in place for employees who are subject to withholding taxes. The plan foresees a maximum award of 200 percent of the number of reference shares granted based on the achievement against the predefined average EPS, relative TSR and sustainability performance targets. Participants are also entitled to receive a dividend equivalent payment at the time of vesting for each awarded share.

(4) In addition to the above awards, three members of the EC participated in the 21st launch of the ESAP in 2024, which allowed them to save over a 12-month period and, in November 2025, use their savings to acquire ABB shares under the ESAP. Each EC member who participated in ESAP was, upon vesting, entitled to acquire up to 210 ABB shares at an exercise price of CHF 48.41 per share.

Exhibit 45: EC shareholding overview on December 31, 2025 (audited)

Name	Total number of shares held on December 31, 2025	Invested on December 31, 2025			
		Reference number of shares under the 2023 performance factors (EPS, TSR and sustainability) of the LTIP ⁽¹⁾	Reference number of shares under the 2024 performance factors (EPS, TSR and sustainability) of the LTIP ⁽¹⁾	Reference number of shares under the 2025 performance factors (EPS, TSR and sustainability) of the LTIP ⁽¹⁾	Replacement share grant for foregone benefits from former employer ⁽²⁾
		(vesting 2026)	(vesting 2027)	(vesting 2028)	(vesting 2028)
Morten Wierod	223,279	31,210	59,509	44,581	—
Timo Ihamuotila	160,000	31,691	26,184	19,616	—
Carolina Granat ⁽³⁾	62,457	23,208	19,175	14,365	—
Mathias Gärtner	3,708	—	31,738	23,777	67,509
Karin Lepasoon	21,126	19,207	15,869	11,889	—
Sami Atiya	70,000	25,609	21,159	16,347	—
Peter Terwiesch	100,210	27,529	22,746	17,536	—
Brandon Spencer	10,317	16,013	26,545	23,853	—
Giampiero Frisio	7,068	21,249	30,091	24,783	—
Total EC members on December 31, 2025	658,165	195,716	253,016	196,747	67,509

(1) The final 2023 LTIP, 2024 LTIP and 2025 LTIP awards will be settled 100 percent in shares, with an automatic sell-to-cover in place for employees who are subject to withholding taxes.

(2) It was decided to assign the 2025 LTIP performance measures and targets to the Performance Share Units (PSUs) replacement grant of Mathias Gärtner. As a result, the two tranches previously reported have been combined into one tranche and the vesting date has been extended from November 2026 and November 2027 to April 21, 2028. The vesting level of the PSUs depends on the achievement of the applicable 2025 LTIP performance targets. The final replacement awards will be settled 100 percent in shares. Shares are entitled to receive dividend equivalent payment on the final number of vested shares.

(3) This includes 1,200 shares held by spouse.

Exhibit 46: EC shareholding overview on December 31, 2024 (audited)

Name	Total number of shares held on December 31, 2024	Unvested on December 31, 2024					
		Reference number of shares under the 2021 performance factors (EPS and TSR) of the LTIP ⁽¹⁾	Reference number of shares under the 2022 performance factors (EPS, TSR and sustainability) of the LTIP ⁽¹⁾	Reference number of shares under the 2023 performance factors (EPS, TSR and sustainability) of the LTIP ⁽¹⁾	Replacement share grant for foregone benefits from former employer ⁽²⁾	Replacement share grant for foregone benefits from former employer ⁽²⁾	Replacement share grant for foregone benefits from former employer ⁽²⁾
		(vesting 2025)	(vesting 2026)	(vesting 2027)	(vesting 2025)	(vesting 2026)	(vesting 2027)
Morten Wierod (CEO as of August 1, 2024)	170,999	28,736	31,210	59,509	—	—	—
Timo Ihamuotila	200,000	31,609	31,691	26,184	—	—	—
Carolina Granat ⁽³⁾	38,018	23,148	23,208	19,175	—	—	—
Mathias Gärtner (EC member as of November 1, 2024)	—	—	—	31,738	6,275	33,507	34,002
Karin Lepasoon	690	19,157	19,207	15,869	—	—	—
Sami Atiya	100,000	25,543	25,609	21,159	—	—	—
Tarak Mehta	100,330	26,501	27,529	22,746	—	—	—
Brandon Spencer (EC member as of August 1, 2024)	—	9,541	16,013	26,545	—	—	—
Giampiero Frisio (EC member as of August 1, 2024)	1,381	14,404	21,249	30,091	—	—	—
Total EC members on December 31, 2024	611,418	178,639	195,716	253,016	6,275	33,507	34,002

(1) The final 2021 LTIP, 2022 LTIP and 2023 LTIP awards will be settled 100 percent in shares, with an automatic sell-to-cover in place for employees who are subject to withholding taxes.

(2) The first tranche of the replacement share grant consists of Restricted Share Units and will vest one year after the grant. The second and third tranche of the replacement share grant consist of Performance Share Units and will vest two respectively three years after the grant. The tranche vesting in 2026 has been corrected from 33,057 to 33,507. The vesting level of the Performance Share Units depends on the achievement of the applicable performance targets. The final replacement awards will be settled 100 percent in shares. Shares are entitled to receive dividend equivalent payment on the final number of vested shares.

(3) This includes 1,200 shares held by spouse.

Exhibit 47: Targeted and realized EC total compensation in 2025

Target compensation (in CHF)	Base salary	Pension benefits	Other benefits ⁽¹⁾	Target 2025 short-term incentive ⁽²⁾	Grant fair value of 2022 LTIP grant ⁽³⁾	Grant fair value of replacement grant ⁽⁴⁾	Target total variable compensation	Target total compensation
Morten Wierod	1,500,007	288,696	487,002	1,500,000	810,519	n.a.	2,310,519	4,586,224
Timo Ihamuotila	990,004	545,180	630,979	990,000	891,570	n.a.	1,881,570	4,047,733
Carolina Granat	725,012	446,719	461,388	725,000	652,920	n.a.	1,377,920	3,011,039
Mathias Gärtner	800,009	181,531	370,273	800,000	n.a.	305,781	1,105,781	2,457,594
Karin Lepasoon	600,000	259,774	295,873	600,000	540,336	n.a.	1,140,336	2,295,983
Sami Atiya	820,841	508,162	526,065	825,000	720,548	n.a.	1,545,548	3,400,616
Peter Terwiesch	880,837	517,127	541,064	885,000	747,485	n.a.	1,632,485	3,571,513
Brandon Spencer ⁽⁵⁾	716,788	66,207	74,455	735,231	269,113	n.a.	1,004,344	1,861,794
Giampiero Frisio ⁽⁵⁾	818,022	158,692	86,961	829,625	406,279	n.a.	1,235,904	2,299,579
Total	7,851,520	2,972,088	3,474,060	7,889,856	5,038,770	305,781	13,234,407	27,532,075

Realized compensation (in CHF)	Base salary	Pension benefits	Other benefits ⁽¹⁾⁽⁶⁾	Actual 2025 short-term incentive ⁽⁷⁾	Realized value of 2022 LTIP award ⁽⁸⁾	Realized value of replacement grant ⁽⁹⁾	Total variable compensation	Total compensation
Morten Wierod	1,500,007	288,696	572,438	1,827,000	2,252,028	n.a.	4,079,028	6,440,169
Timo Ihamuotila	990,004	545,180	716,984	1,223,640	2,477,187	n.a.	3,700,827	5,952,995
Carolina Granat	725,012	446,719	522,951	873,625	1,814,122	n.a.	2,687,747	4,382,429
Mathias Gärtner	800,009	181,531	381,304	974,400	n.a.	372,735	1,347,135	2,709,979
Karin Lepasoon	600,000	259,774	347,315	730,800	1,501,338	n.a.	2,232,138	3,439,227
Sami Atiya	820,841	508,162	565,255	534,600	2,001,783	n.a.	2,536,383	4,430,641
Peter Terwiesch	880,837	517,127	615,502	1,117,755	2,076,865	n.a.	3,194,620	5,208,086
Brandon Spencer ⁽⁵⁾	716,788	66,207	94,727	766,111	747,750	n.a.	1,513,861	2,391,583
Giampiero Frisio ⁽⁵⁾	818,022	158,692	117,321	1,065,239	1,128,668	n.a.	2,193,907	3,287,942
Total	7,851,520	2,972,088	3,933,797	9,113,170	13,999,741	372,735	23,485,646	38,243,051

Achievement levels (in %) ⁽¹⁰⁾	Base salary	Pension benefits	Other benefits	2025 short-term incentive	2022 LTIP	Replacement grant	Total variable compensation	Total compensation
Morten Wierod	100.0%	100.0%	117.5%	121.8%	277.8%	n.a.	176.5%	140.4%
Timo Ihamuotila	100.0%	100.0%	113.6%	123.6%	277.8%	n.a.	196.7%	147.1%
Carolina Granat	100.0%	100.0%	113.3%	120.5%	277.8%	n.a.	195.1%	145.5%
Mathias Gärtner	100.0%	100.0%	103.0%	121.8%	n.a.	121.9%	121.8%	110.3%
Karin Lepasoon	100.0%	100.0%	117.4%	121.8%	n.a.	n.a.	195.7%	149.8%
Sami Atiya	100.0%	100.0%	107.4%	64.8%	277.8%	n.a.	164.1%	130.3%
Peter Terwiesch	100.0%	100.0%	113.8%	126.3%	277.8%	n.a.	195.7%	145.8%
Brandon Spencer ⁽⁵⁾	100.0%	100.0%	127.2%	104.2%	277.8%	n.a.	150.7%	128.5%
Giampiero Frisio ⁽⁵⁾	100.0%	100.0%	134.9%	128.4%	277.8%	n.a.	177.5%	143.0%
Average	100.0%	100.0%	116.5%	114.8%	277.8%	121.9%	174.9%	137.9%

(1) Other benefits comprise payments related to social security, dividend equivalent payments, health insurance, children's education, transportation, tax advice and certain other items.

(2) Target short-term incentive corresponds to 100 percent of the latest applicable annual base salary.

(3) Represents the 2022 LTIP grant date fair value as per April 25, 2021, as disclosed in our Annual Report 2022.

(4) Represents the grant fair value of the Restricted Share Unit tranche of the replacement share grant disclosed in our Compensation Report 2024.

(5) At the time of the 2022 LTIP grant, both Brandon Spencer and Giampiero Frisio were not EC members, but received a 2022 LTIP grant in their respective Division President roles. Therefore, the grant date fair value for them wasn't disclosed in our Compensation Report 2022.

(6) Differences between realized and target values due to higher social security payments related to AIP awards above target values.

(7) Represents accrued short-term incentive for the year 2025, which will be paid in 2026, after the publication of ABB's financial results. STI is linked to the targets and goals defined in each EC member's Annual Incentive Plan.

(8) Valued at CHF 43.25, the closing price of the ABB share on the day of vesting.

(9) Valued at CHF 59.40, the closing price of the ABB share on the day of vesting.

(10) Ratio of realized compensation compared to target compensation.



Report of the statutory auditor

To the General Meeting of ABB Ltd, Zurich

Report on the Audit of the Compensation Report

Opinion

We have audited the Compensation Report of ABB Ltd (the Company) for the year ended December 31, 2025. The audit was limited to the information pursuant to Art. 734a-734f of the Swiss Code of Obligations (CO) in the tables marked "audited" in the Compensation Report.

In our opinion, the information pursuant to Art. 734a-734f CO in the accompanying Compensation Report complies with Swiss law and the Company's articles of incorporation.

Basis for Opinion

We conducted our audit in accordance with Swiss law and Swiss Standards on Auditing (SA-CH). Our responsibilities under those provisions and standards are further described in the "Auditor's Responsibilities for the Audit of the Compensation Report" section of our report. We are independent of the Company in accordance with the provisions of Swiss law and the requirements of the Swiss audit profession. We have also fulfilled our other ethical responsibilities in accordance with these requirements.

We believe that the audit evidence we have obtained is sufficient and appropriate to provide a basis for our opinion.

Other Information

The Board of Directors is responsible for the other information. The other information comprises the information included in the ABB Annual Reporting Suite (consisting of the Integrated Report, the Financial Report, the Corporate Governance Report, the Compensation Report and the Sustainability Statement), but does not include the audited content of the Compensation Report, the consolidated financial statements, the statutory financial statements of ABB Ltd and our auditor's reports thereon.

Our opinion on the Compensation Report does not cover the other information and we do not express any form of assurance conclusion thereon.

In connection with our audit of the Compensation Report, our responsibility is to read the other information and, in doing so, consider whether the other information is materially inconsistent with the audited financial information in the Compensation Report or our knowledge obtained in the audit or otherwise appears to be materially misstated.

If, based on the work we have performed, we conclude that there is a material misstatement of this other information, we are required to report that fact. We have nothing to report in this regard.



Board of Directors' Responsibilities for the Compensation Report

The Board of Directors is responsible for the preparation of a Compensation Report in accordance with the provisions of Swiss law and the Company's articles of incorporation, and for such internal control as the Board of Directors determines is necessary to enable the preparation of a Compensation Report that is free from material misstatement, whether due to fraud or error. The Board of Directors is also responsible for designing the compensation system and defining individual compensation packages.

Auditor's Responsibilities for the Audit of the Compensation Report

Our objectives are to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the information pursuant to Art. 734a-734f CO is free from material misstatement, whether due to fraud or error, and to issue an auditor's report that includes our opinion. Reasonable assurance is a high level of assurance, but is not a guarantee that an audit conducted in accordance with Swiss law and SA-CH will always detect a material misstatement when it exists. Misstatements can arise from fraud or error and are considered material if, individually or in the aggregate, they could reasonably be expected to influence the economic decisions of users taken on the basis of this Compensation Report.

As part of an audit in accordance with Swiss law and SA-CH, we exercise professional judgement and maintain professional skepticism throughout the audit. We also:

- Identify and assess the risks of material misstatement in the Compensation Report, whether due to fraud or error, design and perform audit procedures responsive to those risks, and obtain audit evidence that is sufficient and appropriate to provide a basis for our opinion. The risk of not detecting a material misstatement resulting from fraud is higher than for one resulting from error, as fraud may involve collusion, forgery, intentional omissions, misrepresentations, or the override of internal control.
- Obtain an understanding of internal control relevant to the audit in order to design audit procedures that are appropriate in the circumstances, but not for the purpose of expressing an opinion on the effectiveness of the Company's internal control.
- Evaluate the appropriateness of accounting policies used and the reasonableness of accounting estimates and related disclosures made.

We communicate with the Board of Directors or its relevant committee regarding, among other matters, the planned scope and timing of the audit and significant audit findings, including any significant deficiencies in internal control that we identify during our audit.



We also provide the Board of Directors or its relevant committee with a statement that we have complied with relevant ethical requirements regarding independence, and to communicate with them all relationships and other matters that may reasonably be thought to bear on our independence, and where applicable, actions taken to eliminate threats or safeguards applied.

KPMG AG

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Achim Wolper'.

Achim Wolper
Licensed Audit Expert
Auditor in Charge

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'M. Midani'.

Mohamad Midani

Zurich, Switzerland
February 18, 2026

Caution concerning forward-looking statements

The Compensation Report 2025 includes “forward-looking statements” within the meaning of Section 27A of the Securities Act of 1933 and Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. We have based these forward-looking statements largely on current expectations, estimates and projections about the factors that may affect our future performance, including global economic conditions as well as the economic conditions of the regions and the industries that are major markets for ABB. The words “believe,” “may,” “will,” “estimate,” “continue,” “target,” “anticipate,” “intend,” “expect,” “plan” and similar words and the express or implied discussion of strategy, plans or intentions are intended to identify forward-looking statements. These forward-looking statements are subject to risks, uncertainties and assumptions, including among other things, the following: (i) business risks related to the global volatile economic environment; (ii) costs associated with compliance activities; (iii) difficulties encountered in operating in emerging markets; (iv) risks inherent in large, long term projects served by parts of our business; (v) the timely development of new products, technologies, and services that are useful for our customers; (vi) our ability to anticipate and react to technological change and evolving industry standards in the markets in which we operate; (vii) changes in interest rates and fluctuations in currency exchange rates; (viii) changes in raw materials prices or limitations of supplies of raw materials; (ix) the weakening or unavailability of our intellectual property rights; (x) industry consolidation resulting in more powerful competitors and fewer customers; (xi) effects of competition and changes in economic and market conditions in the product markets and geographic areas in which we operate; (xii) effects of, and changes in, laws, regulations, governmental policies, taxation, or accounting standards and practices and (xiii) other factors described in documents that we may furnish from time to time with the US Securities and Exchange Commission, including our Annual Reports on Form 20-F. Although we believe that the expectations reflected in any such forward-looking statements are based on reasonable assumptions, we can give no assurance that they will be achieved. We undertake no obligation to update publicly or revise any forward-looking statements because of new information, future events or otherwise. In light of these risks and uncertainties, the forward-looking information, events and circumstances might not occur. Our actual results and performance could differ substantially from those anticipated in our forward-looking statements.

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